The Logical Nexus between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib by Wallach, Evan J.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 36 | Issue 2
2004
The Logical Nexus between the Decision to Deny
Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the
Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of
Prisoners in Abu Ghraib
Evan J. Wallach
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda
and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 541 (2004)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/21
THE LOGICAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE DECISION TO DENY APPLICATION
OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE TALmBAN AND AL QAEDA
AND THE MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN ABU GHRAIB*
Evan J. Wallacht
Our values are non-negotiable for members of our profession.
They are what a professional military force represents to the world.'
Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center, on Friday, October 8, 2004.
t Judge, United States Court of International Trade. Adjunct Professor, Law of War,
Brooklyn Law School, George Mason Law School, New York Law School. Visiting
Professor, Law of War, University of Minster. Webmaster ILOWA Home Page,
http://www.lawofwar.org. J.D. Berkeley, 1976, LLB (international law) Cambridge, 1981.
The author's interest in the issues here discussed springs, in part, from his service as an
Attorney/Advisor in the International Affairs Division of the Office of TJAG during the
Persian Gulf War working on, inter alia, prisoner of war and war crimes issues. This article
is respectfully dedicated to my mother, Sara Florence Rothaus Wallach. In answer to Cain's
question, Genesis 4:9, so many times she told us, "You are your brother's keeper." The
author, as a Judge Advocate in the Nevada National Guard from 1989 through 1995, used
those words in briefing the 72nd Military Police Company on the laws of war. About the
72nd Military Police Company, the Schlesinger Committee Report noted:
When Abu Ghraib opened, the first MP unit was the 72nd MP Company, based in
Henderson, Nevada. Known as "the Nevada Company", it has been described by
many involved in investigations concerning Abu Ghraib as a very strong unit that
kept tight rein on operational procedures at the facility. The company called into
question the interrogation practices of the MI Brigade regarding nakedness of
detainees. The 72nd MP Company voiced and then filed written objections to
these practices.
HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
PANEL To REvIEw DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 74 (Aug. 2004).
To those citizen soldiers this article is also dedicated, with pride and respect. The author
also wishes to thank Charles Gittings for his excellent web site, Project to Enforce the
Geneva Convention (PEGC), devoted to enforcement of the Geneva Conventions.
http://pegc.no-ip.info/. His extensive efforts made this research much easier. The views here
expressed represent those only of the author and not of any person with whom, or entity with
which, he is affiliated.
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ library/reports/2004/intell-abu-ghraibarl5-6.pdf (last
visited March 19, 2005).
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Those who do battle with monsters must take care that they do not thereby
become a monster. Always remember that when you gaze into the abyss, the
2abyss gazes back into you.
L Introduction
Revelations of sexual indecencies committed by United States military
personnel against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison,3 and allegations of
other misconduct, followed by repeated leaks of documents related to the
decision making process regarding the status of captured enemy
combatants, forced the release of at least some additional government
documents ("the government memos") relating to the issue. Taken as a
whole, these documents, other known facts, and applicable law demonstrate
that: 1) the legal, and perhaps, the factual basis for the classification of
many Afghan prisoners outside the Third Geneva Convention appears
flawed; 2) the treatment of persons entitled to the rights of prisoners of war
in ways forbidden by the Third Geneva Convention appears to be neither
inadvertent nor incidental; and 3) the application of those coercive
treatment methods to the Abu Ghraib prisoners appears to be related to the
sexual misconduct by prison guards.
This article examines the international law aspects of the determination
by the United States government that Guantanamo detainees - and indeed
all members of the Taliban, including those held and questioned in
Afghanistan without transportation to Guantanamo - are unprotected by the
Third Geneva Convention of 1949 ("GC3") 4. The government memos and
other information released in, for example, press reports and Red Cross
reports5 demonstrate that the government based its decision either on a
finding that the Taliban was not the de facto government of Afghanistan
and therefore its military forces were unprotected by GC3, or on a finding
that the Taliban was the de facto government but its forces were
unprotected for failure to meet certain purported requirements of Article
4(2) of GC3. The article discusses the requirements of Article 5 of GC3
2 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, JENSEITS VON GUT AND BOSE, Part IV, at para. 146 (1964)
(quotation translated by the author).
3 MG ANTONIO TAGUBA, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, Finding of Fact Regarding Part One of the Investigation,
at para. 5, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2004/800-mp-
bde.htm (last visited March 19, 2005) [hereinafter Taguba Report] (characterizing them as
"numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses ...inflicted on several
detainees"); see also id. at Conclusion, para. 1 (concluding that they constituted "grave
breaches of international law")
4 Third Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter the Third Geneva Convention].
5 See discussion infra. at VI.A.2.
[Vol. 36:541
THE LOGICAL NEXUS
which provides that should any doubt exist as to the status of a captured
person, a presumption of POW status continues until a decision to the
contrary has been made by a competent tribunal. This article examines
government memos and other recent information and demonstrates that
reasonable doubt does exist as to at least Taliban6 detainees' status, and that
because they have not, to date, been screened by a competent tribunal, they
continue to be entitled to treatment as POWs. The article also examines the
interrogation methods used to question those detainees and concludes that:
1) as to protected persons, the methods constitute a breach - in some
instances a grave one - of the Third Geneva Convention and 2) the
determination that POW status did not apply appears to have been driven by
a desire to use those interrogation methods to obtain information from
battlefield detainees in a manner not permitted by GC3, and then to admit
that information in trial proceedings using procedural and evidentiary rules
forbidden by GC3.
Finally, the article analyzes the development of those interrogation
methods, their migration to Iraq, and their application to prisoners at Abu
Ghraib. It determines that the sexual misconduct by the Abu Ghraib prison
guards, while not necessarily ordered or directed by higher authority, was
an evolution reasonably foreseeable from the violations of GC3 already in
place. Finally, the article concludes that many of the extraordinary
interrogation methods, as applied, may constitute breaches of both domestic
and international law, depending on the facts of each detainee's case.
II. Background
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade center
and the Pentagon, the President of the United States immediately
characterized those strikes as "an act of war.",7 The United States took swift
military action against the perpetrators; members of al Qaeda, an
international terrorist organization. President Bush demanded that
Afghanistan's ruling party, the Taliban, turn members of al Qaeda over to
6 Al Qaeda detainees present a different question. Their only potential claim to protected
status rests on whether they were, in fact, acting as part of the Taliban when captured. The
issue, depending on individualized facts such as the place, time and manner of capture,
might or might not present an issue for resolution before a competent tribunal. This article
does not examine other arguments which an al Qaeda detainee, who is not a prisoner of war,
might assert regarding the legality of interrogation techniques. For examples of such
arguments, see, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/ html/menu3lb/h_cat39.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) [hereinafter
Torture Convention].
7 Bush Calls Attacks 'Acts of War', BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk
/hi/english/ world/americas/newsid_1537000/1537534.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
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American custody.8  On September 18, 2001, in a joint resolution,
Congress, without declaring war, authorized military action against the
Taliban. 9 By the end of September, the United Nations Security Council
had also adopted two resolutions which (1) identified the attacks on the
United States as a threat to international peace and security,' ° and (2)
mandated that states "[d]eny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support,
or commit terrorist acts."'  On October 7 with the consent of countries
surrounding Afghanistan, the United States began extensive air attacks on
the Taliban military infrastructures and the al Qaeda terrorist organization.' 2
On October 17, the commander of CENTCOM issued an order instructing
that the Geneva Conventions were to be applied to all captured individuals
in accordance with their traditional interpretation.13  By December 21,
2001, the allied coalition held in custody in Afghanistan about seven
thousand suspected al Qaeda and Taliban members. 14 On November 13,
2001, President Bush issued a Military Order providing for the trial before
military tribunals of non-U.S. citizens who were members or culpable
supporters of al Qaeda.15 Following a screening process, in January of
2002 a number of those prisoners identified by the United States as
particularly interesting were transferred to a prison on the U.S. military
8 Bush Announced Opening Attacks, CNN.COM, Oct. 7, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com
/200 l/US/i 0/07/ret.attack.bush (last visited March 19, 2005) [hereinafter Opening Attacks].
9 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (authorizing the use of military force). This
resolution became Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). In further response to the
attacks, on Oct. 26, 2001 Congress adopted the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, which addresses domestic national security issues.
10 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1368 (2001).
" S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR., 56th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
12 Opening Attacks, supra note 8.
13 See HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 80 (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/report/2004/d20040824fmalreport.pdf (last
visited March 20, 2005) [hereinafter Schlesinger Committee Report] ("Belligerents would be
screened to determine whether or not they were entitled to prisoner of war status. If an
individual was entitled to prisoner of war status, the protections of Geneva Convention III
would apply. If armed forces personnel were in doubt as to a detained individual's status,
Geneva Convention III rights would be accorded to the detainee until a Geneva Convention
III Article 5 tribunal made a definitive status determination.").
14 US Questions 7,000 Taliban and al-Qaida Soldiers, GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2001,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,623701,00.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2005).
15 See Press Release, President Issues Military Order: Detention, Treatment and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrororism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2005) [hereinafter Military Order].
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base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By mid 2004, approximately 640 such
prisoners were held at that base.
16
On April 27, 2004, CBS's Sixty Minutes broadcast the first
photographs showing prisoner abuse by American personnel at Abu Ghraib
prison. 17 In early May 2004, the New Yorker Magazine published an
article18 by Seymour Hersh which revealed the existence of an internal
Army report authored by Major General Antonio M. Taguba.19 According
to Hersh:
Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were
numerous instances of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" at
Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba
reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police
Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community.
(The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to
[BG Janice] Karpinski's brigade headquarters.) Taguba's report listed
some of the wrongdoing:
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom
handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a
military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured
after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee
with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military
working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack,
and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added-
"detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic
photographic evidence." Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as
the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said,
because of their "extremely sensitive nature."
20
16 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004).
'7 Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, CBSNEWS.coM, Apr. 28, 2004, http://www.
cbsnews.com/ stories/2004/04/27/6011/main614063.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
18 Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42,
available at http:/ www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fafact (last visited Mar. 21,
2005).
19 U.S. Army Report on Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, MSNBC NEWS, May 4, 2004, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894001/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) (publishing executive
summary of Taguba Report); see also Shining a Light in a Real Dark Place, USNEwS.COM,
June 19, 2004, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/040719/usnews/19prison.b.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2005) (indexes to the Taguba Report were obtained by the media at a later
date).
20 Hersh, supra note 18.
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Hersh published follow-up articles in two subsequent issues of the
New Yorker. 21  Following the first Hersh article a stream of leaked
photographs and memoranda became a torrent. The materials eventually
included provision to Congress of disks containing thousands of sexually
22explicit photographs depicting sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners, as well as
memoranda drafted by personnel in the White House and by the
Departments of Justice and State.23 The Bush administration, including the
White House, specifically and repeatedly disavowed the use of sexual abuse
as a means of interrogation, and claimed it had never authorized the use of
torture to interrogate prisoners.24 The leaked memoranda, combined with
other known facts, tell a more convoluted, complicated and nuanced tale.
What follows is a progression of legal rationales. These legal
rationales seem to have originated with the decision to try certain captured
prisoners before military tribunals, then they dealt with objections, based on
the Third Geneva Convention, to those tribunals by a Presidential
determination that captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban were
uncovered illegal combatants, and then they determined that because those
individuals were outside the Convention they could be interrogated through
means prohibited by its terms. It appears that it was the application of these
legal rationales, and the Geneva-prohibited interrogation techniques they
approved, which eventually resulted in the abuses of Abu Ghraib.
21 See Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040517fafact2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005);
Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/ fact/content/?040524fafact (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). Citing
the Taguba Report, Hersh wrote that Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of the
detention and interrogation center at Guantanamo, "urged that the commanders in Baghdad
change policy and place military intelligence in charge of the prison." Id. Moreover, Hersh
notes that the Taguba Report "quoted Miller as recommending that 'detention operations
must act as an enabler for interrogation."' Id. Hersh said that Miller "also briefed military
commanders in Iraq on the interrogation methods used in Cuba - methods that could, with
special approval, include sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat, and
placing prisoners in 'stress positions' for agonizing lengths of time. (The Bush
Administration had unilaterally declared Al Qaeda and other captured members of
international terrorist networks to be illegal combatants, and not eligible for the protection of
the Geneva Conventions.)." Id.
22 See Congress Will Review Unreleased Prisoner Abuse Photos, CAPrrOL HILL BLUE
(Doug Thompson Media, Washington, DC), May 10, 2004, http://www.capitolhillblue.
com/artman/publish/article_452 1.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
23 See discussion, infra Section III.
24 Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics is Disavowed, WASH.
POST, June 23, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A60719-2004Jun22.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
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III. The Bush Administration's Path to Determination ofPOW Status
What follows is a chronological paper trail. For the ease of the
reader, the two central analytical memoranda, the Yoo/Delahunty
Memorandum of January 9, 2002 and the Bybee Memorandum of January
22, 2002 are more fully discussed and analyzed at the end of this section.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued his militar tribunal Order. 5
That Order, and subsequent statements by the President,2 Vice President,27
Attorney General, 28 Secretary of Defense,
29 and the White House Counsel30
25 See Military Order, supra note 15. That Order provides, in part, that individuals subject
to the order include current or past members of al Qaeda, individuals who "engaged in, aided
or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation
therefore" which adversely affected wide United States interests, or who "has knowingly
harbored one or more individuals" described above. Id
26 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Military Tribunals Needed in Difficult Time, Bush Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001 at B5 (quoting President Bush as saying that the nation was fighting
"against the most evil kinds of people, and I need to have that extraordinary option at my
fingertips.").
27 See Elisabth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend
Military Tribunals for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6. Vice President
Dick Cheney, responding to a question following a speech to the United States Chamber of
Commerce on 14 November, 2001, "spoke favorably of World War II saboteurs being
'executed in relatively rapid order' under military tribunals set up by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt." Id. A military tribunal, Cheney said, "guarantees that we'll have the kind of
treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve." Id.
28 See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, White House Push on Security Steps Bypasses
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft as
saying, "Foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United States, in my
judgment, are not entitled to and do not deserve the protections of the American
Constitution, particularly when there could be very serious and important reasons related to
not bringing them back to the United States for justice.... I think it's important to
understand that we are at war now.").
29 See Steven Lee Myers & Neil A. Lewis, Assurances About Military Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at B1O ("[Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld acknowledged that the
rules for military tribunals would be decidedly differently [sic] from those for civilian trials.
And Pentagon officials said today that they were devising regulations that were likely to
include a more flexible standard for evidence than civilian trials would accept. They said the
tribunals would probably allow a conviction of a suspected terrorist on a two-thirds vote of
the officers on the panel."); see also Military Order, supra note 16 (providing for
"sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission
present at the time of the vote, a majority being present...").
30 See COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INTER ARMA SILENT LEGES: IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT SHOULD
THE LAWS BE SILENT? 25 (2001) available at http://pirate.shu.edu/-jenninju/
CivilProcedure/911/NYCBarAssnReportMilitaryTribunalsNov0l.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2005) (stating that at a meeting of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
2004]
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made it clear that the tribunals were intended to follow procedural and
evidentiary rules similar to those used to try spies and war criminals during
and after the Second World War.31 Those World War II era rules included
a rule of evidence first articulated in the 1942 military commission trial of
eight German saboteurs.32 Louis Fisher, in his work Nazi Saboteurs On
Trial noted that the Quirin rule provides that "[s]uch evidence shall be
admitted as would, in the opinion of the President of the Commission, have
probative value to a reasonable man. 33 Section 4(c)(3) of the Bush Order
provided for "admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the
presiding officer of the military commission ... have probative value to a
reasonable person. 34 That rule, as applied in World War Two and in the
post-war tribunals was repeatedly used to admit evidence of a quality or
obtained in a manner which would make it inadmissible under the rules of
evidence in both courts of the United States or courts martial conducted by
the armed forces of the United States.
35
Eventually, the rules under which tribunals are to be conducted were
substantially modified retaining only the World War II evidence rule and a
limited appellate process. To date, no memorandum has been released by
the Bush administration detailing the reason for retaining those two rules. It
is a not unreasonable conclusion that the rules were promulgated and
retained with the specific intention of admitting evidence obtained through
means which would require their exclusion under the Federal Rules of
Law and National Security, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales acknowledged nearly
identical provisions in the two orders).
31 The New York Times quoted a "Bush administration official with knowledge of the
planning said officials had been studying the World War II cases." William Glaberson,
Closer Look at New Plan for Trying Terrorists, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2001, at IA.
According to the N.Y Times "The incident that was uppermost on the minds of Bush
Administration officials in setting up tribunals took place in June 1942, when Nazi Germany
dispatched eight saboteurs to this country to blow up war industries." Robin Toner, Civil
Liberty vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18 2001, at IA. That
incident of course resulted in the military commission procedures tested in Ex Parte Quirin.
32 United States v. Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also Louis FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON
TRIAL 52-53 (2003).
33 FISHER, supra note 32.
34 Military Order, supra note 15.
35 See Evan J. Wallach The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post World War 1
War Crimes Trials: Did They Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 851 (1999) (discussing an examination of war crimes tribunals
following World War II); Evan J. Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin and Uchiyama: Does the
Sauce Suit the Gander?, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2003, at 18 [hereinafter Afghanistan, Quirin and




Evidence and applicable constitutional authority which prohibits or limits
the use of illegally obtained evidence.36
On January 18, 2002, President Bush made a presidential decision that
captured members of Al Quaeda and the Taliban were unprotected by the
Geneva POW Convention.37  That decision was preceded by a
36 See Afghanistan, Quirin and Uchiyama, supra note 35; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 442 (1966) (noting that over 70 years ago, the Court's predecessors eloquently stated:
"The maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare' had its origin in a protest against
the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons,
which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of
the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers
for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not
uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner,
when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of
incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put
to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness
unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a comer, and
to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of
the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal,
the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its
total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general
and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted,
it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence.
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the
minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of
the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a
maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this
country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.");
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS 65-66 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink
.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) [hereinafter WORKING
GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4]; but see DEP'T OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL,
POLICY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
WORKING GROUP REPORT, Mar. 6] (earlier draft of report which differs to a very large degree
from the Apr. 4, 2004 report).
37 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President
George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/
site/newsweek/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales Memo] ("On January 18, 1
advised you that the department of Justice had issued a formal legal opinion concluding that
the Geneva Convention III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPWIII) does not apply to
the conflict with al Qaeda. I also advised that the DOJ's opinion concludes that there are
20041
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Memorandum dated January 9, 2002, submitted to William J Haynes II,
General Counsel to the Department of Defense, by the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, which provides legal counsel to the
White House and other executive branch agencies, and written by Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J.
Delahunty.
38
A. The YoofDelahunty Memorandum of January 9, 2002
The Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum, along with the Bybee
Memorandum,39 provided the analytical basis for all which followed
regarding blanket rejection of the applicability of the Third Geneva
Convention to captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Its validity
is, accordingly, analyzed in some detail at the end of this discussion.
B. The Rumsfeld Order January 19, 2002
In a Memorandum dated January 19, 2002, Secretary of Defense
Donald Runsfeld ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
inform combat commanders that "Al Quaeda and Taliban individuals ...
are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.''4 He ordered that commanders should "treat them
humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions of 1949. '
That order thus gives commanders permission to depart, where they deem it
appropriate and a military necessity, from the provisions of the Geneva
reasonable grounds for you to conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict
with the Taliban. I understand that you decided that GPW does not apply and accordingly
that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of war under the GPW."); Bush Says
No POW Status For Detainees, CNN.cOM, Jan. 28, 2002, available at http://archives.cnn.
com/2002/US/01/28/ret.wh.detainees/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
38 Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://lawofwar.org/YooDelahuntyMemo.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Yoo-Delahunty Memo].
39 Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/
documents/012202bybee.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo].
40 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of the





Conventions. The Memorandum was promulgated as an order by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on the same date.42
C. The Bybee Memorandum of January 22, 2002
The Bybee Memorandum of January 22, 2002 from Jay Bybee, Office
of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
follows the same structural pattern, and sometimes the exact phrasing, as
the Yoo/Delahunty Memo, but with additional analysis of certain
international law and law of war issues. 43 Parts of it are also discussed
below.
D. The Alberto Gonzales Memorandum of January 25, 2002
On January 25, 2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales sent a
Memorandum ("the Gonzales Memo") to President Bush regarding a
presidential decision on January 18, 2002 that captured members of the
Taliban were not protected under the Geneva POW Convention ("GPW"),44
a convention to which the legal advisor to the Secretary of State had
objected. 45  He advised that "there are reasonable grounds for you to
conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict with the
Taliban. ' '46 Mr. Gonzales argued that grounds for the determination might
include:
1) "a determination that Afghanistan was a failed state because the
Taliban did not exercise full control over the territory and people,
42 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to U.S. Commanders
(Jan. 19, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d2004O622doc2.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
43 See Bybee Memo, supra note 39.
44 The White House had issued an Order to that effect, dated February 7, 2002. See infra
Part III.F.
45 Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to
the President 1 (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999363 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2005). Secretary of State Powell argued vigorously that failure to apply the Geneva
POW Convention to the Taliban as a group reversed long-standing U.S. policy and would
adversely affect the nation's standing in the international arena. Id. at 3-5. His projections of
potential issues, including legal problems, proved to be substantially accurate.
46 Gonzales memo, supra note 37, at 1.
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was not recognized by the international community, and was not
capable of fulfilling its international obligations' ' 7 and/or
2) "a determination that the Taliban and its forces were, in fact, not a
government, but a militant, terrorist-like group." 48
Mr. Gonzales then identified what he believed were the ramifications
of Mr. Bush's determination.49 On a positive note, he felt they preserved
flexibility, stating that:
The nature of [the war against terrorism] places a high premium on ...
factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured
terrorists and their sponsors . . .and the need to try terrorists for war
crimes . . . [T]his new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict
limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners...50
47 Id; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2nd Cir. 1995) (discussing
definition of statehood).
48 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 1.
49 Id. at 2-4.
5o Id. at 2. In 1945, Provost Marshal General of the United States Army, Maj. Gen. Archer
Lerch, offered some thoughts on the validity of the 1929 Geneva Convention that seem
relevant to arguments about obsolescence:
The War Department has followed strictly the terms of this treaty in all the
orders and directives that it has issued governing the treatment of prisoners of
war. And I do not believe that any thoughtful person would have the War
Department do otherwise.
The Geneva Convention, I might emphasize is law. Until that law is changed
by competent authority, the War Department is bound to follow it.
That treaty, like other laws, can be changed but it cannot be changed by the
War department's regarding it as a "scrap of paper." Such an attitude on the part
of the War department would mean that our govenmnent is no more honest than
others it severely condemned. It would mean that this government had sacrificed
the place of honor and moral leadership that it has earned in the eyes of the world
and had suck to the level of Japan whose emissaries talked peace while its army
went to war.
I do not intend to indicate that I think the Convention should be changed. I do
not think that any of us are now emotionally fitted to tackle the job of re-
evaluating one of the few international laws that has withstood, with a
considerable measure of success, the hatred and lawlessness that war breeds.
Archer Lerch, The Army of Reports on POWS, AM. MERCURY, May 1945, at 536-47,
available at http://lawofwar.org/Protected%20Persons.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
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He also believed the determination "eliminates any argument
regarding the need for case-by-case determinations of POW status." 1 The
determination, Mr. Gonzales said, also reduced the threat of domestic
prosecution under the War Crimes Act.52 His expressed concern was that
certain GPW language such as "outrages upon personal dignity" and
"inhuman treatment" are "undefined ... and it is difficult to predict with
confidence what actions might be deemed to constitute violations of the
relevant provisions of GPW.,53 Moreover, it would be "difficult to predict
the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on
terrorism., 54  He believed that a determination of inapplicability of the
GPW would insulate against prosecution by future "prosecutors and
independent counsels. 55
Mr. Gonzales then identified the counter arguments from the
Secretary of State,56 which included:
* Past adherence by the United States to the GPW;
* Possible limitations on invocation by the U.S. of the GPW in
Afghanistan;
* Likely widespread condemnation by allied nations;
* Encouragement of potential enemies to find "loopholes" to not apply
the GPW;
• Discouraging turnover of terrorists by other nations;
* Undermining U.S. military culture "which emphasizes maintaining
the highest standards of conduct in combat...
In response to these arguments, Mr. Gonzales says, inter alia, that
"even if the GPW is not applicable, we can still bring war crimes charges
against anyone who mistreats U.S. personnel. 58  He adds that "the
51 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 2.
52 18 U.S.C. §2441 (1997).
53 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 2.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 See Powell Memo, supra note 45.
57 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 3 (identifying and responding to counterarguments
raised by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his memo of Jan. 26, 2002); see also
Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb.
2, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005)
(commenting on the Gonzales Memo and stating: "The President should know that a
decision that the Conventions do apply is consistent with the plain language of the
Conventions and the unvaried practice of the United States in introducing its forces into
conflict over fifty years.").
58 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 3.
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argument based on military culture fails to recognize that our military
remain bound to apply the principles of GPW because that is what you have
directed them to do." 9 In light of subsequent events, that last sentence is of
particular interest.
E. The Ashcroft Letter of February 1, 2002
On February 1, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent President
Bush a letter which strongly indicates the administration's consideration of
conduct which might violate the Third Geneva Convention. 60 Mr. Ashcrofi
articulated two possible theories to support the conclusion that the
protection of POWs under the Geneva Convention did not apply. The first
was the failed-state theory, holding that Afghanistan was not a party to the
treaty; the second an argument that although the Convention applied, the
Taliban were not entitled to POW status because they acted as unlawful
combatants.6' In arguing for the first option, made through a Presidential
determination that Afghanistan was a failed state, Mr. Ashcroft stated:
Thus, a Presidential determination against treaty applicability would
provide the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain
charges that American military officers, intelligence officials, or law
enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention rules relating to field
conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of detainees. The War
Crimes Act of 1996 makes violation of parts of the Geneva Convention a
crime in the United States.62
Attorney General Ashcroft's letter seems to make it clear that by the
end of January, at least, consideration was being given to conduct which
might violate GC3's strictures regarding the detention and interrogation of
prisoners of war.
59 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 4 (emphasis added).
60 Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General John Aschcroft, to President George W.
Bush (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/torture/jash20l02ltr.httnl
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
61 id.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
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F. The Presidential Order of February 7, 2002
On February 7, 2002, President Bush signed an Order63 accepting the
reasoning of the Yoo/Delahunty, Bybee, and Gonzales memos and of the
Attorney General's letter64 validating the order issued by Secretary
Rumsfeld on January, 19, 2002.65 That Presidential Order66 was the
63 Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to Vice President Dick Cheney, et al.
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.corn/2004/images/06/22/bush.memo.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Presidential Order]. The Schlesinger Report notes that
before Mr. Bush signed the February 7th Order, the Legal Advisor to the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and "many of the military service attorneys" had agreed with the Department
of State's position that "the Geneva Conventions in their traditional application provided a
sufficiently robust legal construct under which the Global War on Terror could effectively
be waged." Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13. at 7. Further, "[a]t the February
4, 2002 National Security Council meeting called to decide this issue, the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in
agreement that all detainees would get the treatment they would be entitled to under the
Geneva Conventions." Id. at 34.
64 Presidential Order, supra note 63, at 1-2. The Presidential Memorandum was directed
to Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, CIA Director George Tenet, Presidential
Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Joint Chiefs
Chair Richard Myers. It referred to "[o]ur recent extensive discussions regarding the status
of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees," and noted the discussions confirmed that application of
the Third Geneva Convention to the detainees "involves complex legal questions." Id at 1.
65 See Jim Garamone, Rumsfeld Explains Detainee Status, AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE,
Feb. 8, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02082002_
200202086.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Garamone discusses the Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld's comments on the announcement of the Presidential Order:
White House lawyers thought long and hard about the situation before making
recommendations to Bush, Rumsfeld said. The lawyers were worried about the
precedent their decision could set about detainees in future conflicts, he added.
"Prudence dictated that the U.S. government take care in determining the status of
Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees," he said. "When the Geneva Convention was
signed in 1949, it was crafted by sovereign states to deal with conflicts between
sovereign states." The current war on terrorism is not a conflict envisioned by the
framers of the Geneva Convention, he said.
Rumsfeld stressed that from the beginning, U.S. forces have treated all Taliban
and Al Qaeda detainees humanely. He issued an order in January mandating all
detainees be treated in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention.
"Notwithstanding the isolated pockets of international hyperventilation, we do not
treat detainees in any other manner than a manner that is humane," Rumsfeld said.
Id.
66 The Presidential Order of Feb. 7, 2002 was somewhat nuanced. In reliance on the
Bybee Memo of Jan. 22nd and the Ashcroft Letter of Feb. 1st, the Presidential Order
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articulated basis for all following actions which simply took as a given that
the Third Geneva Convention was inapplicable to any Guantanamo
67detainee.
determined that al Qaeda was not covered by the Geneva Conventions because al Qaeda is
not a party to the Geneva Convention. Presidential Memo, supra note 63, at 1-2. As to the
Taliban, it accepted that the President had constitutional authority to suspend applicability of
the Geneva Conventions to Afghanistan but that he declined to do so at this time. Id.
Instead, based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the recommendation
of the Department of Justice, it determined that the Taliban detainees were "unlawful
combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva." Id.
at 2. The Order did not clarify the basis for that unlawful combatant finding, but it could
only have been made by the President on a finding that while Afghanistan was still a party to
the Treaty, the Taliban were not the defacto government of Afghanistan. As to other claims
of irregularity in uniforms, conduct, and leadership, they clearly do not apply to the regular
armed forces of a signatory power, and accordingly could not be, as a matter of law, the
basis for a Presidential determination of non applicability. See W. Hays Parks, Special
Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493 (2003); Afghanistan, Quirin
and Uchiyama, supra note 35, at 18; but see John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of
Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003) [hereinafter Yoo & Ho] (arguing that to the
contrary, based on a misreading of the intent of the drafters Third Geneva Convention
regarding application of the four part test of Article 4(2) to regular armed forces of a
signatory power under Article 4(2)). That intent is unquestionably found in the traveaux
preparatoire of GC3. See Afghanistan, Quirin and Uchiyama, supra note 35, at I.B.l .b. A
Fact Sheet issued by the White House on Feb. 7, 2002 does contain a statement that:
"Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government,
Afghanistan is a party to the Convention, and the President has determined that the Taliban
are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, however, the
Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs." Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary,
White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, Feb. 7, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200 2 02 07 -13.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2005). How the United States intended that Fact Sheet to be interpreted is facially unclear.
As noted above, apparently, it meant the Third Geneva Convention was applicable to
Afghanistan, but not to the Taliban either because: 1) they were the government of a failed
state, or 2) they failed to meet the requirements of Article 4(2). In either case, it appears
erroneous. Interestingly, the Fact Sheet also states that "The detainees will not be subjected
to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment." Id. Eventually, that statement apparently
became inoperative.
67 As the process was explained by Lawrence Di Rita, a Department of Defense
Spokesperson:
[W]e've been quite clear that the president had determined that the conflict with al
Qaeda was not subject to the Geneva Conventions and that the conflict with the
Taliban, while it was subject to the Geneva Conventions, people picked up as
Taliban would be considered unlawful enemy combatants because we've had a
character of how they fought .... So this was the character of the people who
were in Guantanamo, not prisoners of war, but unlawful enemy combatants and
known al Qaeda terrorists .... [A]nd it was on that basis that what ultimately
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G. Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002
On March 21, 2002, the Secretary of Defense issued Military
Commission Order No.1 ("Commission Order 1") which prescribed
procedures under the President's Military Order.68 While Commission
Order 1 finessed the Presidential Order's two/third's sentencing
requirement, it retained the World War II evidentiary rule and failed to
provide a system of independent appeals.69
From the sequence of events, and discussion by White House Counsel,
it appears fairly clear that the decision by Mr. Bush, and the subsequent
orders from Mssrs Bush and Rumsfeld, were based on the Yoo/Delahunty
Memorandum of January 9, 2002 and the Bybee Memorandum of January
22., 2002. A close analysis of those documents is accordingly appropriate.
IV. Analysis of the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum of January 9, 2002
This Memorandum is written in four parts. The first part examines 18
U.S.C. Section 2441, the War Crimes Act, and some of the treaties it
implicates.70  The second part examines whether members al Qaeda can
claim protection of the Geneva Conventions and concludes they cannot. 71
The third part examines application of those treaties to members of the
Taliban. 72 It concludes non-applicability because it says: 1) "the Taliban
was not a government and Afghanistan was not... a functioning State", 2)
"the President has the constitutional authority to suspend our treaties with
Afghanistan pending restoration of a legitimate government", and 3) "it
became the procedures that General Miller has now talked to at some length were
developed...
News Transcript, Lawrence Di Rita, United States Department of Defense, DoD Background
Briefing (May 20, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/
tr20040520-0788.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Background Briefing].
The assumption persists unquestioned. Thus, for example, the Schlesinger Committee
Report, in discussing the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions, simply accepts that "As a
result of a Presidential determination, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and
Taliban combatants." Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 79.
68 See DONALD H. RUMSFELD, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER
No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/
020321militaryregs.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
69 It provides that "An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members is required to
determine a sentence, except that a sentence of death requires a unanimous, affirmative vote
of all the members." Id. at § 6(F).
70 Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38, at 1.
71 Id. at 1-2.
72Id. at 2.
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appears... that the Taliban militia may have been... intertwined with Al
Qaeda" and thus on the same legal footing. 73  Finally, the fourth part
concludes that customary international law does not bind the President or
restrict the actions of the United States military, under a constitutional
analysis.74
The Memorandum is questionable on many grounds. Its central
operative flaw, however, from the viewpoint of international law, is that as
long as there is a genuine issue of fact or law regarding the status of
captured individual combatants who are members of the Taliban or Al
Qaeda, the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 must apply, until properly
otherwise determined. 75 Article 5 of GC3 provides, in part, that "Should
any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection
of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.
' 76
The key to whether any genuine issue of fact or law exists resides in
the Yoo/Delahunty Memo itself, which is the authoritative basis for all the
actions which follow. Leaving aside the Yoo/Delahunty Memo's American
constitutional arguments77 which present no bar to a delict in international
73 Id.
74 id.
75 The author suggests the fact or law standard of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because it is one with which American courts and lawyers have considerable
experience. The any "doubt language" might constitute an even higher barrier to a non-
determination of POW status, but the author is satisfied that existing facts and statements of
opposition by officials of the United States Government are sufficient to meet test of Rule
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986).
76 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5 (emphasis added).
77 The Yoo/Delahunty and Bybee Memos argue at length that the President, as
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, must, ipso facto, be endowed with all powers
necessary to defend the nation in war time. Thus, they conclude, any action by Congress
which derogates from that power would be inherently unconstitutional. As an example they
cite the War Powers Act. The Memos raise an interesting question of domestic law. Might a
military defendant in an action for breach of the War Crimes Act, raise as a defense, the
superior orders of the President requiring a breach of a congressional mandate? The
argument raises fundamental separation of powers issues which cut to the core of how
American government functions. See Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38; Bybee Memo,
supra note 39. In its stated form, the argument appears unanswered, but existing authority
would seem to cut against it. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 718
(1971) ("The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead it
makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the courts should take it upon
themselves to 'make' a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity,
presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in
Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a
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law, its argument for non-applicability of Geneva III rests on the claim
that as a matter of fact and law the Taliban did not constitute a de facto
government. The short answer is that while the position is certainly
arguable, it is also reasonably arguable that the Taliban were the de facto
government. They controlled a substantial geographic territory and
population, enacted and enforced laws and mandates, carried on relatively
complex military operations, appointed persons to governmental posts and
received diplomatic recognition from several nations. The core validity of
that point is admitted, albeit inadvertently, in the following quote from the
Memorandum from Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales 79 and William Haynes
on January 22, 2002:
Whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the detention and trial of
members of the Taliban presents a more difficult legal question.
Afghanistan has been a party to all four Geneva Conventions since
September, 1956. Some might argue that this requires application of the
Geneva Conventions to the present conflict with respect to the Taliban
militia . . .Nonetheless, we conclude that the President has more than
ample grounds to find that our treaty obligations under Geneva III toward
Afghanistan were suspended during the period of the conflict.
[.. IT]he weight of informed opinion indicates that, for the period in
question, Afghanistan was a "failed state" whose territory had been held
by a violent militia or faction rather than by a government. . . Second,
there appears to be developing evidence that the Taliban leadership had
become closely intertwined with, if not utterly dependent upon, al Qaeda.
law."); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 96 (2004) (holding that United States courts have
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of detention of foreign nationals captured
abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay).
78 See, e.g., U.S. Military Commisssion, Trial of General Anton Dostler, Commander of
the 75th German Army Corps, in 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 22 (1947) [hereinafter The Dostler Case]. Those
arguments present a startling analogy to the arguments raised by defendants at the post
World War II Nuremburg trials and elsewhere that, because they were required by national
law to obey superior orders, they had an absolute defense against war crimes committed in
carrying out those orders. That so called "superior orders" defense was, and has been since,
roundly rejected, although that rejection represented a change from prior law. See id. at 27-
33. The point is, of course, that whatever their validity under U.S. national law, they present
no defense to an otherwise valid charge of a war crime under international law.
79 Note also that in his Memorandum to the President, Mr. Gonzales states that there are
"reasonable grounds ... to conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict
with the Taliban." Gonzales Memo, supra note 37. The existence of reasonable grounds is
simply not the standard for a determination the Third Geneva Convention does not apply.
Rather, as noted, the standard is the existence of any doubt.
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This would have rendered the Taliban more akin to a terrorist
organization... 80
Later in the Memorandum, Jay Bybee continues:
We want to make clear that this Office does not have access to all of
the facts related to the activities of the Taliban militia and al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the available facts in the public record would
support the conclusion that Afghanistan was a failed State . . . Indeed,
there are good reasons to doubt whether any of the conditions were
met.81
What is of particular interest in this analysis is the emphasized
language. It is that of argument, not fact, and what it seems to effectively
admit is that there is indeed some doubt 82 as to the status of the Taliban
* 83detainees. That, of course, triggers the requirements of GenevaConvention Article 5 for a competent tribunal to determine status, and
80 Bybee Memo, supra note 39, at 10-11 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
82 The doubtful nature of the argument is emphasized by the enemy combatant trilogy of
cases issued by the Supreme Court on June 28, 2004. The Court decided various issues
affecting the legal status of persons regarded by the administration as enemy combatants
unprotected by the Third Geneva Convention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004).
Hamdi is of particular importance here. In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor twice
refers to "the Taliban regime" and the "Taliban government." Hamdi, 124 S.Ct., at 2635
(emphasis added). That reference does not appear inadvertent. Justice O'Connor goes on to
say that "it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related
instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy
detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention", citing AR 190-8
§ 1-6. Id. at 2651. Moreover, Justice Souter in his concurrence notes that:
For now it is enough to recognize that the Government's stated legal position in
its campaign against the Taliban... is apparently at odds with its claim here to be
acting in accordance with customary law of war ... In a statement of its legal
position cited in its brief the Government says that "the Geneva Convention
applies to the Taliban detainees." Id. at 2657-58 (citation omitted).
83 In Swift v. Rumsfeld, for example, the government stated that "United States and
coalition forces have removed the Talibanfrom Power." Brief for Respondent at 5, Swift v.
Rumsfeld, No. C04-0777 RSL (W.D. Wash. 2004) (emphasis added). The government
went on to state that "[iln the context of. .. the removal of the Taliban from power ... the
United states.., has seized and detained numerous persons fighting for and associated with
the enemy during the course of the ongoing military campaign." Id. (emphasis added),
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mandates treatment of a prisoner as a POW until the tribunal is held.84
Judge Bybee later discusses Article 5:
"Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act, and having fallen into the hands of the enemy," Article 5
of Geneva III requires that these individuals "enjoy the protections" of the
Convention until a tribunal has determined their status. As we understand
it, as a matter of practice prisoners are presumed to have Article 4 POW
status until a tribunal determines otherwise.
Although these provisions seem to contemplate a case-by-case
determination of an individual detainee's status, the President could
determine categorically that all Taliban prisoners fall outside article 4.
Under Article II of the Constitution, the President possesses the power to
interpret treaties on behalf of the Nation. He could interpret Geneva III,
in light of the known facts concerning the operation of Taliban forces
during the Afghanistan conflict to find that all of the Taliban forces do
not fall within the legal definition of prisoners of war as defined by
Article 4. A presidential determination of this nature would eliminate any
84 As usual, Hays Parks makes the point most cogently:
References to al Qaeda and the Taliban as separate entities constituted an
incomplete and inaccurate picture. The enemy consisted of a loose amalgamation
of at least three groups: the Taliban regime (until its December 2001 collapse,
following which it reverted to its tribal origins), the al Qaeda terrorist group, used
as the Praetorian Guard for the Taliban leadership (both for internal security prior
to and following commencement of US/Coalition operations), and foreign
Taliban. The picture was further complicated by the tendency of some to refer to
the Taliban as the defacto government of Afghanistan, because it exercised rough
control over 80 percent of Afghanistan. This was open to debate until the
collapse of the Taliban, at which time it ceased to be an issue. Until the collapse
of the Taliban regime in December 2001, a strong case could be made that this
was an internal conflict between non-state actors in a failed state. By the time
Army Civil Affairs entered Afghanistan, the case was absolute.
W. Hays Parks, supra note 66, at 505 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, John Yoo and James Ho make the same point at a later date:
Unlike al Qaeda, the Taliban Militia arguably constituted the de facto
government of Afghanistan. To be sure, there is a good case to be made that the
Taliban militia was not even the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan had all the characteristics of a failed state .... On the other hand, the
Taliban militia did effectively control a majority of the territory and population of
Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Conventions.
Yoo & Ho, supra note 66, at 218 (emphasis added).
This statement by Yoo & Ho was followed by an argument that the Taliban failed to meet
the four part test of GC3 Article 4(2).
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legal "doubt" as to the prisoners' status, as a matter of domestic law, and
would therefore obviate the need for Article 5 tribunals.
8 5
This argument presents an interesting question of domestic law as to
whether a Commander in Chief can order a violation of international law by
making a factual finding unsupported by independent evidence. Could one
charged under the War Crimes Act assert as a defense that as a matter of
domestic law there was no grave breach, even though it was clearly a
violation of international law? The answer to that proposition is beyond the
scope of this discussion, although it appears questionable. What the
argument does not do, however, for the same reasons discussed above,8 6 is
85 Bybee Memo, supra note 39, at 30-31. After an effective concession that Articles 4 and
5 "seem to contemplate" status determination on an individualized basis, Judge Bybee's
conclusion that presidential treaty interpretation power allows a categorical factual
determination seems to be a logical non sequitur. Interpretations of law, no matter how
phrased, are simply not determinations of factual status. While, perhaps an argument could
rationally be constructed to claim that the President could constitutionally determine the
interpretation of a treaty, this rationale veers off that path to state instead that the President,
having the power to interpret the meaning of a treaty, can then alter the reality of existing
facts, even if the treaty means what it "seems to contemplate." Any such approach is
incompatible with the core concepts of rule of law, coequal branches of government, and
separation of powers. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). What the Memorandum
does not discuss is what appears to the author of this article to be a fundamental question,
namely, how could the Taliban have harbored members of al Qaeda without controlling a
defined territory and population?
In a speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush noted that
"The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban
regime in controlling most of that country." President George W. Bush, Address to Joint
Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001[US/09/20/
gen.bush.transcript (last visited Mar. 27, 2005). He demanded that, inter alia, the Taliban
"[d]eliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land,"
and that it "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to
appropriate authorities... The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over
the terrorists or they will share in their fate." Id. International law defines a state generally
as "an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its
own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities." Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2nd Cir. 1995). The Taliban did
obtain formal recognition as the de jure government from three U.N. member states. Prior to
September 11, 2001 the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan had formally
recognized the Taliban as the government and entered into diplomatic relations with them.
See UAE Withdraws Recognition of the Taliban, CNN.COM, Sept. 22, 2002, at http://archives
.cnn.com/2001/US/09/21/gen.america.under.attack (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
It would seem axiomatic that the other two requirements of statehood must have been met.
That is, unless the Taliban controlled a defined territory and population, the United States
could not have demanded that they deliver all the al Qaeda terrorists "who hide in your
land." President Bush's reference to the Taliban's control of "most of that country" only
strengthens that position. See also Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama, supra note 35.
86 See The Dostler Case, supra note 78.
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present any defense to charges by any other Geneva III signatory charged to
prosecute perpetrators of grave breaches wherever they may be found.
In any case, because doubt as to the POW status of Taliban detainees
appears with considerable force to exist, the language of Article 5 provides
them with POW status until determined otherwise by a proper tribunal. 87
V. The Legal Effects of Applicability of the Third Geneva Convention
Article 5's requirement that prisoners shall enjoy protection as
prisoners of war until properly determined to be outside the Convention,88
creates a duel dilemma for the United States. Not only has it promulgated
rules for military tribunals which constitute grave breaches of GC3, it has
also treated detained individuals in a manner which clearly violates the
Convention's strictures. To the extent that persons entitled to the "any
doubt" standard of Article 5 have not properly had their status determined
before a competent tribunal, that protection continues in force. It appears
beyond doubt that such a tribunal was not provided, and that the decision to
deny it was intentional.
A. No Captured Persons Held at Guantanamo Have Been Provided
With or Offered a Tribunal Which Satisfies Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention
None of the screening processes applied to the Guantanamo detainees,
either pre-shipment from Afghanistan, during incarceration, or following
the Supreme Court's mandate in Hamdi,89 meets the requisites of Article 5.
87 In an appearance with the author at the Federalist Society in New York on September
27, 2004, John Yoo said to the audience that, in fact, his arguments regarding non-state
status had been rejected by the White House, and that determination of non-combatant status
was based on the four part test of Article 4(2). That rationale does not appear from the
Presidential Order. See Presidential Memo, supra note 63. However, if this rationale is
correct, the concession that the Taliban were the army of a de facto state only makes the
existence of a genuine doubt as to POW status more compelling. Not only is the four-part
test inapplicable to state armed forces but its factors, as applied to irregular forces not part of
the state's army, may arguably require an individualized determination varying from unit to
unit. Thus, for example, the wearing of a recognizable sign, the bearing openly of arms, and
the obeying the laws of war may well vary from person to person and unit to unit.
88 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4.
89 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). In her plurality opinion Justice O'Connor
pointed out that "the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it
uses in classifying individuals as [enemy combatants]." Id. at 2639.
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Those requirements are satisfied by the Army Regulation dealing with
Prisoners of War,90 but its provisions have not been applied at Guantanamo.
1. No Article 5 Tribunal Has Been Convened or Held Regarding
Any Captured Member of Al Qaeda91 or the Taliban
The Army Regulation governing treatment of POWs directly
incorporates Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. Army Regulation
190-8 provides that:
a. In accordance with Article 5, GPW, if any doubt arises as to
whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been
taken into custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of
the categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the . . . Convention, until such time as
their status is determined by a competent tribunal.
c. A competent tribunal shall be composed of three commissioned
officers, one of whom must be of field grade... Another officer,
[preferably a JAG officer] shall serve as the recorder. 92
AR 190-8 1-6(e) then establishes the procedures for a competent
tribunal. It requires, inter alia , that tribunal members and the recorder be
sworn, that a written record be made of the proceedings, that the
proceedings be open except for deliberation and voting or other matters
which would compromise security, that persons whose status is to be
determined be advised of their rights, be allowed to attend all open
hearings, be allowed to call reasonably available witnesses and to question
witnesses called by the Tribunal, to testify or otherwise address the
Tribunal, and that they may not be compelled to testify. 93  Lastly,
90 U.S. ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8: ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED
PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND OTHER DETAINEES (Oct. 1, 1997), available at
http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/rl90_8.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2005) [hereinafter AR
190-8].
91 The status of an al Qaeda detainee is, of course, problematical and fact driven. Often, it
appears most closely analogous to pirates or common criminals. The problem arises if
captured persons functioned, as alleged in the Yoo/Delahunty Memo, as an intertwined part
of al Qaeda. See Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38. Given the amorphous nature of al
Qaeda, on any given day the individual's status might be as a Taliban fighter, an irregular
militia supporter, a Taliban agent, a terrorist, or a common criminal.
92 AR 190-8, supra note 90, at § 1-6.
9' Id. at § 1-6(e)
[Vol. 36:541
THE LOGICAL NEXUS
"Preponderance of evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this
determination."
94
The Army's adoption of specific procedures to satisfy the competent
tribunal requirement is not, of course, definitive. While it demonstrates the
Army's conclusion that the procedures set out in AR 190-8 meet the
procedural requirements for such a tribunal, there might be any number of
other processes designed by GC3 signatories that result in a competent
tribunal using differing national standards consistent with the underlyving
notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the Convention.
What adoption of those procedures does definitively establish,
however, is 1) a set of self-binding administrative regulations which cannot
be haphazardly abandoned under domestic law, 96 and 2) more importantly
in the international context, a concession that in order to meet the
Convention's underlying requirement that national standards applicable to
capturing powers' own soldiers be used in judging potential liability of
enemies captured on the battlefield,97 standards at least consistent with
national Procedures, as well as the Third Geneva Convention must be
applied. 9  In any case, having established the national standard for
94 Id. at §1-6(e)(9). Of particular interest here, the Regulation requires that where a
witness is not reasonably available, "written statements, preferably sworn, may be submitted
and considered as evidence." Id. at § 1-6(e)(6). Thus there appears to be a vital distinction
between AR 190-8 screening and the tribunal procedure. While the screening panel is
permitted to admit affidavit evidence (which would be, unless it met an exception, hearsay),
and indeed unswom affidavit evidence where necessary, it is not permitted to use evidence
obtained in violation of the protections provided to POWs by the Third Geneva Convention.
That right against forced self-incrimination is clearly articulated: "Persons whose status is to
be determined may not be compelled to testify before the tribunal." Id. at § 1-6(e)(8).
95 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 99 ("No moral or physical coercion
may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act
of which he is accused.").
96 The United States Supreme Court has held that while an agency is free to change its
policy based on either a change of circumstances or a changed view of the public interest,
"an agency [that changes] its course must supply a reasoned analysis" for the change. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
57 (1983).
97 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 102.
98 Thus, for example, the requirements of AR 190-8 1-6(e) that proceedings be open
except for deliberation and voting "or other matters which would compromise security,"
comports with Article 105's provision that "representatives of the Protecting Power shall be
entitled to attend the trial of the case, unless, exceptionally, this is held in camera in the
interest of State security." AR-190-8, supra note 90, at §1-6(e)(3)&(8); Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 105. Moreover, Article 105's provision that "they may not
be compelled to testify" seems mandated by Article 99, which states that "[n]o moral or
physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit
himself guilty of the act of which he is accused," as well as U.S. national standards. Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 105 & 99.
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determining who is a POW, the United States may not abandon it at will.
To do so would fly in the face of every concept of rule of law and
regulation of armed conflict developed over the past two hundred years. It
would also be a direct and criminal violation of the standards for minimal
conflict in war time developed at Nuremburg. 99 Unfortunately, however,
99 See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremburg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11-
14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), available at http://www.southbaymobilization.org/pactions/
demands/nuremberg.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Nuremburg Principles].
Principle I
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law
is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
Principle II
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a
crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act
from responsibility under international law.
Principle III
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does
not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
Principle IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him.
Principle V
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair
trial on the facts and law.
Principle VI
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under; international law:
Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment
of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public
or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity.
Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and
other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on
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the screening processes developed for those persons confined at
Guantanamo have not met AR 190-8 standards.'00
2. The Process Used For Screening Enemy Combatants Prior to
Incarceration at Guantanamo Does Not Meet Article 5
Requirements
According to a Fact Sheet issued by the Department of Defense in
February, 2004,101 the process for screening persons shipped to
Guantanamo included an initial enemy combatant determination,10 2
assessment in the field, centralized assessments in the area of operations,10 3
a general officer review,1°4 DOD review, 0 5 and a further assessment at
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions
are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or
any war crime.
Principle VII
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime under international law.
Id.
100 Failure to meet those standards is not, of course, in itself a crime. What it may create,
however, is a situation in which a prisoner continues to be entitled to POW status and GC3
protections because he has not been determined to be otherwise by a competent tribunal.
That status, and its protections, may then constitute an element of a criminal violation, where
other facts, such as improper interrogation techniques, or a trial in violation of Article 102,
are present. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 102.
1o1 See Press Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 16, 2004),
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Mar/17-718401.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2005).
102 Id. "At the time of capture and based on available information, combatant and field
commanders determine whether a captured individual was part of or supporting forces
hostile to the United States or coalition partners, and engaged in an armed conflict against
the United States. Such persons are enemy combatants." Id.
103 Id. "A military screening team at the central holding area reviews all available
information, including interviews with detainees. With assistance from other U.S.
government officials on the ground (including military lawyers, intelligence officers, and
Federal law enforcement officials) and considering all relevant information (including the
facts from capture and detention, threat posed by the individual, intelligence value, and law
enforcement interest) the military screening team assesses whether the detainee should
continue to be detained and whether transfer to Guantanamo is warranted." Id.
104 Id. "When determining whether a detainee should be transferred, the combatant
commander considers the threat posed by the detainee, his seniority within hostile forces,
possible intelligence that may be gained from the detainee through questioning, and any
other relevant factors." Id.
20041
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Guantanamo.10 6 None of those reviews comports with, or even resembles,
the requirements of AR 190-8.1°7 Although there is some procedural
improvement, the Combatant Status Review Panels established in 2004 to
screen all Guantanamo detainees have similar failings.
3. Combatant Status Review Panels Do Not Meet the Requirements
of Article 5
On July 7, 2004 Depurty Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
following the issuance of the Supreme Court's enemy combatant trilogy
°8
promulgated an Order establishing a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.'0 9
That procedure requires that a detainee be notified of the opportunity to
contest his designation as an enemy combatant and be assigned a military
officer to assist in the review process and with the ability to review
"reasonably available" DOD information relating the detainee's
classification.'10 Each Tribunal is to be composed of three neutral
105 Id. "An internal DOD review panel, including legal advisors, reviews the
recommendations of the combatant commander and advises the Secretary of Defense on
proposed detainee movements to Guantanamo. All available information is considered,
including information submitted by other governments or obtained from the detainees
themselves." Id.
106 id. "Reviews are based on all relevant information, including information derived from
the field, detainee interviews, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement sources, and foreign
governments." Id.
107 For example, "a military screening team at the central holding area reviews all
available information, including interviews with detainees" and considers "all relevant
information" to assesses "whether the detainee should continue to be detained and whether
transfer to Guantanamo is warranted." Guantanamo Detainees, supra note 101. This
screening provides none of the procedural safeguards, such as a right against self-
incrimination, found in AR 190-8 and GC3 Article 99. See AR 190-8, supra note 90, at §1-
6(e)(8); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 99.
108 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2663 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004); Runsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). The Rasul majority opinion states in a
footnote to its opinion that:
Petitioners' allegations - that although they have engaged in neither combat nor
acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive
detention for more than two years... without access to counsel and without being
charged with any wrongdoing - unquestionably describe "custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2698 n.15 (citations omitted).
109 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Secretary of the
Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Panels (July 7, 2004), available at





commissioned officers including a judge advocate, with another officer as a
non-voting Recorder."' Section g of the Order establishes the tribunal's
procedures. Section (g)(9) is of particular interest:
The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would
apply in a court of law. Instead the Tribunal shall be free to consider any
information it deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue before
it. At the discretion of the Tribunal, for example, it may consider hearsay
evidence, taking into account the reliability of such evidence in the
circumstances. The Tribunal does not have the authority to declassify of
change the classification of any national security information it reviews. 2
Comparison of that procedure with AR 190-8, Section 1-6(e)(8) is
enlightening.13 The Army-created screening panel allows hearsay
affidavits as a specific exception. It does not provide the wholesale Querin
exception to evidentiary procedure found in the Rules for Military
Tribunals. That exception is apparently intended to vitiate the right against
self-incrimination by allowing the admission of information obtained in a
fashion which would make it excludable in a court of law." 4 Otherwise,
1 Id.
112 Id. at 3.
113 See AR 190-8, supra note 90, at §1-6(e)(8).
114 In a New York Times article, James Risen et al. writes:
The methods employed by the C.I.A. are so severe that senior officials of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation have directed its agents to stay out of many of the
interviews of the high-level detainees, counterterrorism officials said. The F.B.I.
officials have advised the bureau's director, Robert S. Mueller III, that the
interrogation techniques, which would be prohibited in criminal cases, could
compromise their agents in future criminal cases, the counterterrorism officials
said.
James Risen et al., The Struggle for Iraq: Detainees; Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top
Qaeda Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004 at Al.
The pernicious effects of failure to provide procedural guarantees in screening was again
demonstrated by reports of apparent refusal by a screening panel to weigh exculpatory
evidence regarding a German national held at Guantanamo. Classified evidence obtained by
the WASH. POST in the screening of Murat Kurnaz contained entirely exculpatory materials,
except a memorandum filed by an unidentified government official and unsupported by any
unconclusory statements. According to the WASH. POST:
In Kumaz's case, a tribunal panel concluded that he was an al Qaeda member
based on "some evidence" that was classified. But in nearly 100 pages of
documents, now declassified, U.S. military investigators and German law
enforcement authorities said they had no such evidence. Only one document in
Kumaz's file, a short memo written by an unidentified military official, concludes
that [he] is an al Qaeda member. It says he was working with German terrorists
and trying in the fall of 2001 to reach Afghanistan to help fight U.S. forces.
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the change in language from AR 190-8 to Section (g)(9) to make hearsay
exemplary rather than exclusive makes no sense. Essentially then, what the
DOD has done in promulgating this Order is to reiterate its ability to obtain
information in a manner in violation of the Third Geneva Convention" 5 and
to use that information in a manner adverse to the person from whom it was
obtained. If that individual is someone who is, in fact, presumed to be a
POW under GC3 Article 5, the implications are troubling.
B. Failure to Screen Under Article Five Leaves Captured Enemy
Combatants In A Presumed POW Status Which Is Not
Retroactively Vitiated By A Later Proper Screening
The language of the Prisoner of War Convention is very clear. Article
5 of GC3 provides, in part, that:
Carol Leonnig, Panel Ignored Evidence On Detainee, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at Al
(underlying source materials unavailable to author at time of final submission for
publication).
The Post then noted that in a "recently declassified version" of a January decision by
Judge Joyce Hens Green, she wrote that the panel's decision appeared to be based on a
single document labeled "R-19." Id. She said she found that to be one of the most troubling
military abuses of due process among the many Guantanamo cases that she has reviewed.
The R-19 memo, she wrote, "fails to provide significant details to support its conclusory
allegations, does not reveal the sources for its information and is contradicted by other
evidence in the record." Id. Green reviewed all the classified and unclassified evidence in
the case. Id.
The incident reinforces the lesson learned in earlier conflicts. Procedural fairness matters.
Discussing why the Central Intelligence Agency failed in to detect Soviet spies, James Jesus
Angleton, the former head of CIA counter-intelligence, was quoted in a different but
analogous context: The real problem, Angleton concluded, "was that there was no
accountability. And without real accountability, everything turned to shit." JOSEPH TRENTO,
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA 478-79 (2005).
115 In any case, the Combatant Status Review Panels are in violation of Article 5 because
they act in violation of the Article. That argument is not circular. In a recent filing in Al Ajmi
v. U.S., the government provided a copy of the record of proceedings before the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal related to Al Ajmi attached to the Declaration of James R. Crisfield
Jr. Respondents' Factual Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioner
Abdullah Saleh Ali Al Ajmi at 1, Fawzi Khalid Adbullah Fahad Al Odah v. U.S. (D.C.
2004) (No. 02-CD-0828). The conclusion of the Tribunal is telling: "The detainee is
properly classified as an enemy combatant because he willingly affiliated himself with the
Taliban." Id. at para. 7(b) (Emphasis added). Thus, the screening authorities are still taking
as binding authority the Presidential Order of February 7, 2002, and they are still failing to
make an independent judgment about a detainee's status. Having failed to do so, as long as
doubt continues to exist about an individual status, the presumption of Article 5 persists, and
violation of his rights under the Third Geneva Convention continue to violate the law.
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Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal.
16
Accordingly, any such persons are protected by the Third Geneva
Convention until a competent tribunal determines otherwise. The language
of the Convention on determination of non-POW status is purely
prospective, and it appears quite certain that such a determination, if it did
occur, would not operate retroactively to validate actions by captors which
were otherwise violations of the rights of protected persons.
Thus, in United States v. Uchiyama,117 a United States military
commission tried the Commanding General of the Japanese Fifteenth Area
Army, his Chief of Staff, his Judicial Officer, the three members of the
Japanese commission, the prosecutor and the executioner who carried out
death sentences imposed by that body and confirmed by the convening
authority. Defense counsel attempted to argue that the executed American
airmen had, in fact been guilty of war crimes for the firebombing deaths of
hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians.
18
The prosecution argued, and the court accepted the argument, that the
substantive guilt or innocence of the executed Americans was irrelevant to
the case at hand.119 Rather, it argued, a capturing power was bound to
apply certain minimum trial standards, even to crimes not committed as a
POW, 120 and that the failure of the Japanese court martial to do so resulted
116 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5 (emphasis added).
117 Case 35-46, United States v. Uchiyama, War Crimes Branch Files, Records of the
Judge Advocate General, Record Group 153 (Tried at Yokohama, July 18, 1947) (National
Archives, Suitland, MD) (on file with author) [hereinafter Uchiyama Case].
118 id.
1191d.
120 See Yamashita v Styre, 327 U.S. 1 (1945). At the time, under the 1929 Geneva
Convention, the United States took the position that fair trial requirements applied only to
crimes committed while the accused was a prisoner of war, and not to war crimes before
capture. Accordingly, the defense moved for acquittal. Id. at 22-23. The prosecution argued,
based on other similar trials of Japanese convening authorities, that while the specific
procedural protections of the 1929 Geneva Convention did not apply, the customary
protections of the laws of war did. Id. at 24-26. The Motion was denied. Id. at 26. The
Yamashita position regarding applicability of Geneva procedural protections only to post
capture crimes was specifically rejected and changed by the drafters of the 1949 Prisoner of
War Convention. Article 85 of GC3 contains a provision, not found in the 1929 Convention
analyzed in Yamashita, that: "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining
Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the
present Convention." Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 85. In discussions of
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in substantive liability of the convening authority, the members of the court,
and the prosecutor for the deaths of the American defendants caused by a
unfair trial, even if the airmen had been guilty of illegally bombing
civilians. 121
The analogy here to the Uchiyama authority is straightforward. A
capturing power may not treat a person protected by the laws of war or the
Geneva Conventions in a manner which violates those laws or the
Convention, and then be heard to say that it later learned he should have
been unprotected. 
22
Article 74 of the Stockholm Draft, i.e. the precursor to GC3 Article 85, the representative of
the Netherlands:
pointed out that the 1929 Convention only dealt with crimes committed during
captivity. That view had been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
of America.... The Conference of Government Experts of 1947 considered it
reasonable, however, not to deprive a prisoner of war of the protection of the
Convention on the mere allegation that he had violated the laws and customs of
war, but to leave him under the protection of the Convention until such violation
had been proven in a court of law, in other words until he had been sentenced by a
court of such a crime or offense.
2A Diplomatic Conference Convened by the Swiss Federal Council for the Establishment of
International Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Apr. 21-Aug. 12, 1949, Final
Record, at 318 [hereinafter Stockholm Draft] (emphasis added).
121 The prosecution's opening statement before that U.S. commission is telling:
From a reading of the trial brief filed by the defense in this case prior to the arraignment,...
it became apparent to the prosecution that by way of defense the accused would have the
Commission conduct a posthumous trial of Lt. Nelson and Sergeant Augunas with the hope
of having them adjudicated guilty of some offense ... Now the prosecution desires to
emphasize and make abundantly clear this one fact: We are now charging the accused with
having failed to have applied to these prisoners of war the type of procedure that they were
entitled to. In other words they applied to them a special type of summary procedure which
failed to afford them the minimum safeguards for the guarantee of their fundamental rights
which were given them both by the written and customary laws of war. While we do not for
a moment admit that Lt. Nelson or Sergeant Augunas were guilty of any offense, we none
the less say that if they were guilty, under international law they were nevertheless entitled
to the minimum standard of a fair, lawful and impartial trial. What they may have done
cannot now be heard as a defense for failure of these accuded to afford them a proper trial
as defined under international law.
Uchiyama Case, supra note 117, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
122 See also Case 33, Trial of General Tanaka Hisakasu and Five Others, in 6 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 66 (U.N. War Crimes Commission eds., 1948),
available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/hisakasu.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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C. The Effects of Denying Screening Are Not Merely Procedural
The protection provided to a captured person by the Article 5
presumption is not merely procedural. As long as the Convention protects
an individual, grave breaches of its provisions constitute a breach of both
U.S. and international law.
Article 130 of the Convention provides that grave breaches include
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property
protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the
forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
123
Similarly, the War Crimes Act provides, in part, that any national of
the United States who commits a war crime, "shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to
the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death."' 124 The term "war
crime" as used in the statute means, inter alia, any conduct defined as a
grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva
August 12, 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United
States is a party.
125
Thus, the status of individuals tried before military tribunals is not one
of mere academic curiosity. If a detainee, classified by the United States as
an enemy combatant unprotected by the Third Geneva Convention, is tried
in a manner violative of that Convention, and if there is some doubt as to
his status as a POW, the trial is itself a grave breach if it does not follow
regular court martial procedures.1
26
D. Conclusion Regarding Legal Effects of Application of GC3
The Bush Orders of January and February 2002, denying Geneva
Convention protection to captured members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda
appear inherently flawed. The international law analysis upon which they
are based relies on a factual position, that the Taliban were not the de facto
government of Afghanistan, or on a legal analysis, that the Taliban were
required to meet the four part test of Article 4(2), which is subject to some
doubt. Thus, acts carried out in furtherance of those Presidential Orders, if
themselves violations, might, accordingly, constitute war crimes. The
123 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 120.
124 18 U.S.C. §2441 (1997)
125 id.
126 For a more detailed discussion of these rights and procedures, see Afghanistan, Quirin
and Uchiyama, supra note 35.
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determination that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were uncovered by the Third
Geneva Convention seems logically to be the first of a two step process
undertaken by the Bush Administration to legally justify the use of
interrogation methods in violation of that Convention. An examination of
those methods, their rationale, and legality is thus appropriate, for as a
DOD Working Group determined in examining useful interrogation
techniques:
it became apparent that any decision whether to authorize a technique is
essentially a risk benefit analysis that generally takes into account the
expected utility of the technique, the likelihood that any technique will be
in violation of domestic or international law, and various policy
considerations. Generally the legal analysis that was applied is that
understood to comport with the views of the Department of Justice.
Although the United States, as a practical matter, may be the arbiter of
international law in deciding its application to our national activities, the
views of other nations are relevant in considering their reactions, potential
effects on our captured personnel in future conflicts, and possible liability
to prosecution in other countries and international forums for
interrogators, supervisors and commanders involved in interrogation
processes and decisions. 127
VI. Interrogation Techniques Used Against Members of the Taliban and Al
Qaeda Violated the Third Geneva Convention and, IfAny Such Person
Was Protected by the Convention, Constituted A Grave Breach
From the date the United States began capturing prisoners in
Afghanistan 28 questions of their Geneva Convention status, and thus how
127 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 65-66 (emphasis added); see also
discussion infra Part VI.A. 1.c.
128 The first substantial U.S. ground operations against the Taliban commenced on
October 19, 2001. John Diamond, First U.S. Ground Raid Hits Taliban, CI. TRiB., Oct. 21,
2001, at Cl, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/ news/specials/911/showcase/chi-
warinafghanistanstrike,0,7664856.story (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Much of the ground
combat was conducted by allied Afghan forces supported by U.S. special operations troops
and air power. Harold Kennedy, Will Special Ops Success 'Change the Face of War?',
NAT'L DEF. MAG., Feb. 2002, available at http://www.nationaldefense
magazine.org/issues/2002/ Feb/WillSpecial.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Following
initially desultory combat, the Taliban rapidly collapsed before the allied forces which
captured Herat on November 12th, Kabul on November 13th, and Kunduz on November
24th. By November 25th, substantial U.S. conventional ground forces (Marines) were
landing in Afghanistan for the first time, and enough prisoners were held from Kunduz
alone, that a prison revolt in Mazar-i-Sharif by Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters resulted in the
deaths, inter alia, of a CIA agent, about 30 Northern Alliance soldiers, and more than 500
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they could be questioned, necessarily arose.129 The Third Geneva
Convention, of course, substantially limits methods for interrogating enemy
POWs.
A. Interrogation Methods Against Members of the Taliban And
Al Qaeda
The key to legal analysis of the position taken by the United States
regarding interrogation of captured members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
as it relates to any prisoner of war status they might possess, may be found
in a Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales from Jay S. Bybee of the Office of
Legal Counsel on August 1, 2002, concerning standards of conduct for
interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §2340-2340A. 30  The essence of that
Memorandum is that the protections of the Third Geneva Convention for
POWs need not be considered in interrogations because they are
inapplicable to Al Qaeda and the Taliban.' 3  Judge Bybee makes no
attempt to justify the use of such violative conduct against POWs; he
simply distinguishes it from torture. 132 Thus the questions for discussion
Taliban prisoners. Laura Hayes, Timeline: The Taliban, INFOPLEASE, at
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/taliban-time.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
129 It is worth noting that President Bush issued his Military Order providing for trials
before tribunals which permitted the admission of evidence which would, in the context of
the Third Geneva Convention, be inadmissible, on November 13, 2001, before the United
States held substantial numbers of POWs. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004). The
Order was also well before he determined that the Third Geneva Convention was
inapplicable to the Taliban and al Qaeda. See discussion infra Part III.F & notes. The
determination to use such evidence seems to indicate early consideration of the use of non-
standard interrogation techniques, since ipso facto, evidence obtained through the
interrogation techniques found in FM 34-52 is not dissimilar from that obtained using
standard American police techniques, and would be admissible in courts martial or district
courts.
130 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, to White House Counsel
Alberto R. Gonzales 5 (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo 20020801.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005)
[hereinafter Bybee Memo 1I] (opining that no International Criminal Court jurisdiction
would lie for acts discussed because under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, "to constitute a
war crime, torture must be committed against 'persons protected under the relevant Geneva
Conventions"' and that per President Bush's determination, neither members of the Taliban
nor al Qaeda are so protected.).
131 Similarly, the Working Group Report of April 4, 2004, while recognizing the
impropriety of application of many of the interrogation techniques to Prisoners of War,
largely avoids the issue by accepting as valid the command determination that all captured
persons at issue in the Report are unlawful combatants unprotected by GC3. See WORKING
GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 3-4, 58.
132 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130.
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here become: 1) what interrogation methods were used and against whom?,
2) were they permissible under GC3?, and 3) what is the relationship of
their use to the legal analysis previously discussed?
There is considerable firsthand evidence of interrogation methods
consisting of statements by the United States government, accusations by
former detainees, and leaked or released information, documents and
photographs; more may be inferred from what is known. Thus, for
example, if it is a known fact that detainees were forcibly shaved'3 3 prior to
their transportation to Guantanamo Bay, and that the maintenance of a full
beard is considered a religious obligation by such individuals, 134 it may be
inferred that a possible object of that shaving was intimidation or
psychological degradation of the prisoner. 35 This analysis will first discuss
admitted interrogation techniques (including some which the United States
government says were unauthorized). Then it will look at allegations of
interrogation methods alleged by former detainees which have not been
revealed, or which the administration says were not authorized for use
against that detainee at the time or place alleged. 36  The legal analysis
articulated by the United States will then be briefly discussed. Finally, this
section will examine what appears to be the relationship of the tribunal's
rules and procedures, and Department of Justice positions on applicability
of the Third Geneva Convention and on standards of conduct for
interrogation.
133 MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABu GHRAIB
DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 89 (Aug. 25, 2004),
available at http://www.cdi.org/news/law/fay-report.pdf [hereinafter Fay Report] (noting
that at Abu Ghraib, it was alleged a civilian analyst "bragged and laughed about shaving a
detainee and forcing him to wear women's red underwear").
134 Taliban Measure Beards with Lantern Glass, NNI, Dec. 3, 1998, at
http://www.rawa.org/beard.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) (noting that in 1998, the Taliban
declared the maintenance of a full beard by men a religious compulsion and announced
punishment of 45 days in jail for those who shaved, and seven lashes for those who trimmed
their beard).
135 See Sclessinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 94 (referencing in its glossary a
Behavioral Science Coordination Team which it defines as a "[t]eam comprised of medical
and other specialized personnel that provides support to special operations forces"). It might
be a fruitful area of research to review those teams' analyses of cultural weaknesses of
Moslem prisoners.
136 Thus, for example, certain interrogation techniques authorized for use at Guantanamo
during a relatively short time between Dec. 2002 and Jan. 2003, were allegedly used against
prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Iraq in 2004.
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1. Interrogation Techniques Revealed By the United States
A number of interrogation techniques have been discussed internally
by the United States government as used or approved for use. They include
standard Army methods in compliance with the Third Geneva Convention,
as well as other approaches which are either questionable or clearly exceed
the strictures protecting POWs. Several of the latter may also violate other
limitations outside the scope of this article. 137 The best place to begin any
analysis of interrogation techniques used by the United States in war time is
with the standard interrogation approach found in the U.S. Army's field
manual on Intelligence Interrogation.
137 Because this article deals with rights inherent to POWs in an international conflict, it
does not closely consider the protections more broadly applicable to other detained persons.
Those protections might include, common article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (GCI), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 3118;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GCII), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6.3 U.S.T.
3217, 3320, 3322; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GCIII), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6.3 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 3320; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GCIV), art. 3, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516, 3518,
3520 [hereinafter Four Geneva Conventions of 1949]; the Torture Convention, Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mar. 9,
1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. G.A.O.R., U.N.Doc A/810 (1948), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/index.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7,
1978); and the Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Vicitms of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). The Protocols are not ratified by the
United States. However, the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain the Martens Clause
requiring that in cases not covered by the Conventions, the Protocols or other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience. See Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens
Clause and the Laws ofArmed Conflict, 317 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 125 (1997), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpListl 33/32AEA038821 EA35EC 1256
B66005A747C (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Accordingly, the Additional Protocols might be
considered customary law.
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a. The Army Intelligence Interrogation Field Manual
Army FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 138 is the Army's
standard procedure for interrogation of captured enemy personnel. It was
the basis for the initial interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo.'
39
The DOD says that from January 11, 2002, when the first detainees arrived
at Guantanamo, the "doctrine contained in Field Manual 34-52 guided
interrogations" until December 2002, and that "initial approaches governing
interrogations at Guantanamo were in accordance with the standing
doctrine outlined in FM 34-52. These procedures include 17 techniques
such as direct questioning and providing incentives."
1 40
That Field Manual requires in Chapter 1, under the heading
"Prohibition Against Use of Force," that:
The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant
and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither
authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates
that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for
interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can
induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.
However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys,
verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the
interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be
confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized
techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of
mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are
intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a
source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their
enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law
and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force
renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat.
138 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 34-52 INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (May 8, 1987),
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fm/fm34-52 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter FM 34-52].
139 See Memorandum from LTC Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to Commander,
Joint Task Force 170, at 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see also discussion infra
Part VI.B.3.
140 Press Release, Dep't of Defense, DOD Provides Details on Interrogation Process (June
22, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040622-0930.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
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Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions
established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats
of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques. 141
In its discussion of proper interrogation techniques, FM 34-52
identifies five pertinent phases of interrogation, including approach and
questioning. 142  It notes that "all approaches in interrogations have the
following purposes in common: to establish and maintain control over the
source and the interrogation; to establish and maintain rapport between the
interrogator and the source; and to manipulate the source's emotions and
weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation.' 1 43 It adds that "[t]he number
of approaches used is limited only by the interrogator's imagination and
skill. Almost any ruse or deception is usable as long as the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions are not violated. The Geneva Conventions do not
permit an interrogator to pass himself off as a medic, chaplain, or as a
member of the Red Cross (Red Crescent or Red Lion)."144
Interrogation then shifts to the questioning phase. "Although there is
no fixed point at which the approach phase ends and the questioning phase
begins, generally the questioning phase commences when the source begins
to answer questions pertinent to the specific objectives of the
interrogation." T 45 The questioning techniques discussed are not dissimilar
to those found in domestic police investigations: the use of non-pertinent
questions, for example, "to conceal the interrogation's objectives or
strengthen rapport," and of repeated questions to assess the source. 1
46
b. The Development of Additional Counter Resistance
Strategies
Following the creation of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay,
interrogators apparently used methods approved by FM 34-52 but with
limited success. 14' By October 2002, Joint Task Force authorities were
seeking approval for the use of additional means.
141 FM 34-52, supra note 138, at ch. 1.





147 See, e.g., Memorandum from LTC Jerald Phifer, Director, J2, to Commander, Joint
Task Force 170, at 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jun2004/d2O040622doc3.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (discussing the use of those
methods, and their limitations). The limitations of FM 34-52 and the Third Geneva
Convention, however, were apparently not entirely observed even prior to this date. At least
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i. The Request For Approval of Counter Resistance
Strategies
In early October 2002, Joint Task Force 170,148 the SOUTHCOM
entity charged with prisoner interrogation at Guantanamo Bay, forwarded a
Request for Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies ("Request for
Approval") of October 11, 2002.149 That Request for Approval, in turn,
from the time prisoners were shipped to Guantanamo, their beards were forcibly shaved.
U.S. Authorities justified the act as necessary for hygiene. See, e.g., Letter from Shafiq
Rasul and Asif Iqbal, to the Honorable Chair and Members of the United States Armed
Services Committee 3 (May 13, 2004), at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/
docs/ltr%/20to%20Sentate%2012may04v2.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter
Shafiq Rasul Letter]. Article 14 of GC3 provides, in part, that "Prisoners of war are entitled
in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour." Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14. Article 16 provides for no adverse distinction based
upon, inter alia, "religious belief." Id. at art. 16. Article 34 provides that "[p]risoners of war
shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at
the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine
prescribed by the military authorities." Id. at art. 34. In 1946, Australian authorities
prosecuted Japanese guards who shaved the beards of Sikh prisoners of war and forced them
to smoke cigarettes in violation of their religious beliefs. See Case No. 65, Trial of Tanaka
Chuichi and Two Others, in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 62 (U.N. War
Crimes Commission. eds., 1948).
148 "United States Southern Command [SOUTHCOM] established Joint Task Force
160/170, which was responsible for operating the detainee detention facility and conducting
interrogations to collect intelligence in support of the War on Terrorism. Joint Task Force
160 was established in January 2002 and was tasked with taking care of captured enemy
combatants from the war on terrorism. Joint Task Force 170 was stood up by Southern
Command on 16 February 2002, and tasked with handling interrogation operations for the
Department of Defense as well as ensuring coordination among government agencies
involved in the interrogation of the suspected terrorists." Joint Task Force GTMO,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jtf-gtmo.htm
(last visited Mar. 29, 2005). In August 2002, "based on difficulties with the command
relationships," they merged into Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Schlesinger Committee
Report, supra note 13, at 71.
149 Memorandum from Major General Michael B. Dunlavey, to Commander of U.S.
Southern Command 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jun2004/d20O40622doc3.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). The request was accompanied by
a Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies. See Beaver Memo, supra note
139 (presuming the correctness of the proposition that detainees at Guantanamo were
unprotected by the Geneva Conventions); see also discussion infra Part VI.B.
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was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the SOUTHCOM
Commander on October 25, 2002.15°
The Request for Approval noted that the "current interrogation
guidelines" limit the ability of interrogators to counter advanced
resistance. 1 51 It proposed three categories of interrogation techniques. 
52
150 Memorandum from James T. Hill, General, U.S. Army, to Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/
d20040622doc4.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
151 See Dunlavey Memo, supra note 149, at para. 2; see also Beaver Memo, supra note
139 (identifying "current techniques" as those outlined in FM 34-52). The Field Manual
discusses low intensity conflicts in chapter 9, and under the heading "Legal Status of
Insurgents, it provides that:
EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and
are governed by the guidelines and limitations provided by the Geneva
Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subversive underground
elements who are seeking to overthrow an established government in an
insurgency do not hold legal status as belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since
these subversive activities are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals
operating in this context seek to avoid open involvement with host-government
police and military security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by
host-government security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions
beyond the basic protections in Article 3. The insurgent will be subject to the
internal security laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness.
Action of US forces, however, will be governed by existing agreements with the
host country and by the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
FM 34-52, supra note 138, at ch. 9.
Under the heading "Handling of Insurgent Captives and Suspects," it provides:
Insurgency is identified as a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection
against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. It is not usually a
conflict of international character, and it is not a recognized belligerency.
Therefore, insurgent captives are not guaranteed full protection under the articles
of the Geneva Conventions relative to the handling of EPWs. However, Article 3
of the Conventions requires that insurgent captives be humanely treated and
forbids violence to life and person -- in particular murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment, and torture. It further forbids commitment of outrages upon personal
dignity, taking of hostages, passing of sentences, and execution without prior
judgment by a regularly constituted court.
Humane treatment of insurgent captives should extend far beyond compliance
with Article 3, if for no other reason than to render them more suceptible to
interrogation. The insurgent is trained to expect brutal treatment upon capture. If,
contrary to what he has been led to believe, this mistreatment is not forthcoming,
he is apt to become psychologically softened for interrogation. Id. (emphasis
added).
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Category I included an initial comfortable environment, but if the
detainee was determined by the interrogator to be uncooperative, could
include 1) yelling (but not loudly enough to cause physical pain), and 2)
techniques of deception including multiple interrogators and
misidentification of the interrogator as a citizen of a foreign country with a
reputation for harsh treatment of detainees. 153
Category II, which required the permission of the General in Charge of
the Interrogation Section, included the use of stress positions, including
standing, for a maximum of four hours, the use of falsified documents or
reports, solitary confinement for up to thirty days,' 54 interrogation in other
than the standard interrogation booth, sensory deprivation, 5 hooding with
unrestricted breathing, removal of all comfort items, including religious
items, feeding cold Army rations, removal of clothing, forced grooming,
including shaving of facial hair, etc. and the use of detainees individual
phobias, such as fear of dogs, to induce stress. 156
152 If from no other source, the Joint Task Force was aware of certain cultural issues
involving the detainees through discussions with the International Committee of the Red
Cross. See Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate T.L. Miller, to Commaner Joint Task
Force 160 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/GitmoMemoO1-21-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). In notes from a
meeting between, inter alia, Judge Advocates from SOUTHCOM and JTF 160, and ICRC
representatives on January 21, 2002, the Red Cross raised the issues of privacy and beards.
JAG notes from that meeting include "Islamic people are very private as concerns their
bodies" and "Could closely trimmed beards be tolerated?" Id. at enclosuie(1). They also
note regarding "red/orange colored clothing" that "[i]n their culture, red clothing as a sign
that someone is about to be put to death." Id. The ICRC also articulated the detainees'
desires for prayer caps, prayer beads, Korans, and prayer tapes. Id. Two days later, in a
Memo to File dated January 24, 2002, the JTF 160 SJA noted initial responses to the issues
raised, including the placing of opaque plastic around the showers because "showering in
front of the guards is a great embarrassment to the detainees, and men of the Muslim culture
are much more sensitive about their privacy than men in the Western culture."
Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate, to File, at para. 5 (Jan. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/gitmomemos.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2005). Regarding the issue that "[d]etainees wish to grow a short beard in
accordance with their religion," it was noted the matter, along with return of prayer beads,
was "under consideration." Id. at para. 12. Korans were distributed.
153 Phifer Memo, supra note 147.
154 Phifer Memo, supra note 147, at para. 2.b.3 (stating that "[e]xtensions beyond the
initial 30 days must be approved by the Commanding General," and that "[flfor selected
detainees, the OIC [Officer in Charge], Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with
the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.").
'5' Id. at para. 2.b.5 (describing sensory deprivations as "[d]eprivation of light and
auditory stimuli").
156 See id. at para. 2.b.1-12.
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Category III techniques 157 include the use of "scenarios designed to
convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are
imminent for him and/or his family, ' '158 "exposure to cold weather or water
(with appropriate medical monitoring),"' 59 "use of a wet towel and dripping
water to induce the misperception of suffocation,"' 160 and "use of mild, non-
injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the
finger and light pushing."'
16 1
ii. Approval of Additional Counter Resistance
Techniques
On December 2, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 62 approved
Category I and II techniques and the fourth technique in Category III, i.e.
mild, non-injurious physical contact. 63 The use of death threats to family,
exposure to cold weather and water, and simulated drowning was not
approved, although DOD General Counsel advised they "may be legally
available."' 64 A number of those techniques were apparently used.' 65 On
157 Id. at para. 2.c. Category III techniques could only be used after approval by the
Commanding General following a request by the Director of the Joint Interrogation Group,
with "appropriate legal review and information to [the SOUTHCOM] Commander." Id.
They "may be utilized in a carefully coordinated manner to help interrogate exceptionally
resistant detainees, and "[a]ny of these techniques that require light grabbing, poking or
pushing will be administered only by individuals specifically trained in their safe
application." Id.
158 Id. at para. 2.c.1.
159 Id. at para. 2.c.2; see also Robert Lifton, Doctors and Torture, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED.
415 (2004).
160 Phifer Memo, supra note 147, at para. 2.c.3. The technique is similar to the so-called
"water cure" used by American troops against Philippine insurgents at the beginning of the
last century. Water cure is a form of interrogation. "In one variation, of which the subject is
tied or held down in a chair and with his face covered with a cloth, water is poured over his
face. The subject feels like he is drowning and this is done to encourage the subject to talk.
Another variation is to pour water down the throat of the subject being careful not to drown
the subject but to make the subject feel the sensation of drowning." See Water Cure,
WIKPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water-cure (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005) (Eds. note: Wikipedia is an online, public-forum, encyclopedia).
161 Phifer Memo, supra note 147, at para. 2.c.4.
162 Based on a recommendation from DOD General Counsel William J. Haynes II, Deputy
General Counsel Douglas Feith, and General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. See Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep't of
Defense, to Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), available at
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January 15, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded 166 his approval of Category
II and one of the Category III techniques pending a study by DOD General
Counsel. 167  He noted that "[s]hould you determine that particular
techniques in either of these categories are warranted in an individual case,
you should forward that request to me. 168  Approval of Category I
techniques apparently remained in effect.
On March 6th, the Working Group issued a Draft Report, 169 and on
April 4th a final version of the document.
70
c. The Working Group Report
The Working Group consisted of representatives from a broader
spectrum than the government's prior analytical reports on interrogation.'
17
They produced a document which, except for one central flawed
165 See Press Release, Office of Dep't of Defense General Counsel, GTMO Interrogation
Techniques (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/world/daily/graphica/interrogation_ 062304.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (identifying
Category I and II techniques used between December 2002 and January 15, 2003, including
under Category I, yelling (not directly into ear) and deception through introduction of a
confederate detainee and Arole playing by interrogator in next cell; and under Category II,
applied techniques include removal from social support, segregation, isolation, interrogation
in a different location (still at Guantanamo), deprivation of light (using a red light),
introducing stress through use of a female interrogator, up to 20 hour interrogations, removal
of all comfort items including religious items, serving MREs instead of hot rations, forced
grooming (to include shaving facial hair and head), and use of false documents).
166 See Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 7 (stating that Rumsfeld
rescinded his approval as a result of concerns raised by the Navy General Counsel).
167 See Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Commander
USSOUTHCOM, Counter-Resistance Techniques (Jan. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/ d20040622doc7.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
In a separate memorandum to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense,_Secretary
Rumsfeld simultaneously directed the establishment of a working group within the DOD to
assess the legal, policy and operational issues relating to the interrogation of detainees. See
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C. to General
Counsel of the Dep't of Defense, Detainee Interrogations (Jan. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc6.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005.
168 Rumsfeld Memo to USSOUTHCOM, supra note 167.
169 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Mar. 6, supra note 36.
170 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36.
171 The Working Group included representatives from the Offices of the Undersecretary of
(Defense Policy), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the General Counsels of the Air Force,
Army and Navy and Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Judge Advocates
General of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and the Joint Staff Legal Counsel and
J5. Id at 2.
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assumption, is sophisticated, well wrought and legally supportable. 172 That
flawed assumption is the validity of the Presidential determination that the
detainees were facially uncovered by the Third Geneva Convention.
17 3
Thus, the Report opines that:
Due to the unique nature of the war on terrorism in which the enemy
covertly attacks innocent civilian populations without warning, and
further due to the critical nature of the information believed to be known
by certain of the al-Qaida and Taliban detainees regarding future terrorist
attacks, it may be appropriate for the appropriate approval authority to
authorize as a military necessity the interrogation of such unlawful
172 The Working Group Report constitutes both factual and legal analysis. It is discussed
here, but also is compared and contrasted with the Bybee and Beaver Briefs. See discussion
infra VI.B. The sea change reflected in the Working Group Report may indicate the shift to
at least considering some input from military lawyers:
Lawyers from the military's Judge Advocate General's Corps, or JAG, had been
urging Pentagon officials to ensure protection for prisoners for two years before
the abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison came to light, current and former JAG
officers told ABCNEWS. But, the JAG lawyers say, political appointees at the
Pentagon ignored their warnings, setting the stage for the Abu Ghraib abuses. "If
we, 'we' being the uniformed lawyers, had been listened to, and what we said put
into practice, then these abuses would not have occurred," said Rear Admiral Don
Guter (ret.), the Navy Judge Advocate General from 2000 to 2002. Specifically,
JAG officers say they have been marginalized by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy, and William Haynes II, the Pentagon's General Counsel,
whom President Bush has nominated for a judgeship on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
See ABC World News Tonight: Prisoner Abuse Lawyers Jumping in the Fray (ABC
television broadcast, Sat., May 15, 2004) (transcribed by the author).
173 Thus, the Report states that:
The laws of war contain obligations relevant to the issue of interrogation
techniques and methods. It should be noted, however, that it is the position of the
U.S. Government that none of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of Aug. 12, 1949 (Third Geneva
Convention) apply to to al Qaida detainees because, because, inter alia, al Qaida
is not a High Contracting Party to the Convention. As to the Taliban, the U.S.
position is that the provisions of Geneva apply to our present conflict with the
Taliban, but that Taliban detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 4 (citing for both propositions the
Presidential Determination, dated Feb. 7, 2002, which is based on the Attorney General's
and OLC's legal memoranda discussed above).
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combatants in a manner beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner
of war who is subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 174
After extensive discussion of domestic and international legal
implications, 175 the Working Group discusses considerations affecting
policy. 176 That discussion noted the policies articulated by FM 34-52.77 and
its predecessor, FM 30-15.t78
The fundamental principle underlying Army doctrine concerning
intelligence interrogations [prior to FM 34-52] is that the commander may
utilize all available resources and lawful means in the accomplishment of
his mission and for the protection and security of his unit. However, a
strong caveat to this principle noted, "treaty commitments and policy of the
United States, international agreements, international law and the UCMJ
require the conduct of military to conform with the law of war." FM 30-15
also recognized that Army intelligence interrogations must conform to the
specific prohibitions, limitations and restrictions established by the Geneva
Conventions . . .for the handling and treatment of personnel captured or
detained by military forces. 1
79
The Working Group also noted that "FM 30-15 emphasized a
prohibition on the use of force during interrogations," including the "actual
use of force, mental torture, threats and exposure to inhumane treatment of
any kind.' 8 0 It pointed out that:
FM 30-15 stated that experience revealed that the use of force was
unnecessary to gain cooperation and was a poor interrogation technique,
given that its use produced unreliable information, damaged future
interrogations, and induced those being interrogated to offer [false
information]. However, FM 30-15 stated that the prohibition on the use
of force, mental or physical, must not be confused with the use of
psychological tools and deception techniques... 181
174 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
175 This discussion was limited by the Presidential Declaration of inapplicability of GC3.
For more information and discussion of the domestic and international legal implications,
see discussion infra Part VI.B.
176 WORKING GROuP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 51-61.
177 See discussion supra Part VI.A. 1.a.
178 Army Field Manual 30-15 was in effect from 1945 until its replacement in 1987 by FM
34-52. Its provisions were also applied by the other armed services of the United States.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 51.
179 Id. (emphasis added). FM 30-15 noted that violations of customary and treaty law
would normally also violate the UCMJ and be prosecuted under it, as well as giving rise to
potential command liability. See id.
180 See id. at 52.
181 Id.
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In its discussion of FM 34-52, the Working Group pointed out that it
had "adopted the principles and framework for conducting interrogations of
FM 30-15," and that it, along with the curriculum at the U.S. Army
Intelligence Center, "continue to emphasize a prohibition on the use of
force." 182 It noted:
The underlying basis for this prohibition is the proscriptions contained
in international and domestic U.S. law. .. Army interrogation experts view
the use of force as an inferior technique that yields intelligence of
questionable quality. 1
83
The Working Group also identified a number of policy considerations
articulated by the Department of Defense. 184 The core of that policy is that
"[c]hoice of interrogation techniques involves a risk benefit analysis in each
case bounded by the limits of DOD policy and U.S. law."'185
The DOD policy guidance confirmed that priority was being given to
intelligence gathering, but stated that there would be continued assessment
of "the value of information on detainees for prosecution considerations.' 86
In the event of a request to shift that priority, it noted, factors to be
considered would include "potential benefit derived from an effective
1
12 Id. at 53.
183 Id. (emphasis added).
184 The policy statement was provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict). Id. at 54. The Assistant Secretary is
Thomas O'Connell.
185 Id. at 55. The Assistant Secretary's policy guidance also includes what the author
considers a wise and highly perceptive statement of a core policy reason for the importance
of international law to the armed forces of the United States:
When assessing whether to use exceptional interrogation techniques,
consideration should be given to the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed
Forces culture and self-image, which at times in the past may have suffered due to
perceived law of war violations. DOD policy, reflected in the DOD Law of War
Program implemented in 1979 and in subsequent directives, greatly restored the
culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing high benchmarks of
compliance with the principles and spirit of the law of war and thereby humane
treatment of all persons in U.S. Armed Forces' custody. In addition consideration
should be given to whether implementation of such exceptional techniques is
likely to result in adverse effects on DOD personnel who become POWs,
including possible perceptions by other nations that the United States is lowering
standards relating to the treatment of prisoners generally.
Id. (citations omitted).
116 Id. at 54.
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interrogation compared to potential benefit from a better opportunity for
effective prosecution. ' 87 It provided that:
For interrogations involving exceptional techniques approved by
[Secretary Rumsfeld], standard doctrine may be used as well as the
specifically authorized exceptional techniques. However, such
interrogations may only be applied in limited, designated settings
approved by [Secretary Rumsfeld or his designee], staffed by personnel
specifically trained in their use and subject to a command/decision
authority at a level specifically [designated by Secretary Rumsfeld].1
88
It is in its discussion of the potential effect of interrogation techniques
on prosecutions that the Working Group Report is most directly relevant to
the analysis here. It notes, Adepending on the techniques employed, the
admissibility of any information may depend on the forum considering the
evidence.189  It then considers two issues of direct relevance here:
prosecution by the United States before a military commission, court
martial or Article III court, and the effect of the Geneva Conventions if they
are indeed applicable despite the Presidential Determination.
i. The Working Group's Analysis of Admissibility
of Evidence Obtained By Extraordinary
Interrogation Techniques Before a Commission,
Court Martial, or District Court
The Working Group noted that although the standard of admissibility
for military commissions is fairly low, i.e. probative value to a reasonable
person, "many of the [interrogation] techniques may place a burden on the
prosecution's ability to convince commission members that the evidence
meets even that lower standard."'190 Their analysis is encouraging, even if it
is incongruent with the past history of the evidentiary standard:19
'87 Id. at 55. It is at this point that the DOD seems to recognize on the record that the two
might be mutually exclusive, a point which seemed lost on the Department of Justice. See,
e.g., Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38 & discussion supra Part IV.
188 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 55. The DOD policy also required
all interrogations involving exceptional methods had to be applied in the context of a
comprehensive plan which had to include at least appropriate approval authority. Id. at 56.
189 Id. The Report points out that admissibility is necessarily fact specific depending on
the exact techniques used. Id.
190 Id.
191 See discussion supra note 37. The analysis would be much more persuasive if the
appellate process was through the courts rather than the executive branch.
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As the interrogation methods increase in intensity, the likelihood that the
information will be deemed coerced and involuntary and thus held
inadmissible increases. Although voluntariness of the confession is not a
specific threshold question on admissibility, it can reasonably be expected
that the defense will raise voluntariness, challenging the probative value
of the information and hence, its admissibility. If the statement is
admitted, voluntariness will undoubtedly be a factor considered by the
members in determining the weight given to the information.' 
92
The Working Group's speculation that a fair approximation of at least
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule would be applied in a
commission unbound by law and precedent is, unfortunately, contrary to
past experience. As previously noted, examination of past applications of
the Quirin evidence rule include substantial abuses, often offensive to basic
notions of fair play. Their analysis of the admissibility of extraordinary
interrogation results in a court martial or U.S. District Court is much more
congruent with precedent. Under those standards the Working Group
noted:
If the actions taken to secure a statement constitute torture the statement
would be inadmissible. 193 It should be noted that conduct does not need
to rise to the level of "torture" or "cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment" for it to cause a statement to be involuntary,
and therefore inadmissible. As such, the more aggressive the
interrogation technique used, the greater the likelihood it could adversely
affect the admissibility of any acquired statements or confessions.'
94
To the extent that court martial or district court standards apply, the
emphasized language above is a direct refutation of Judge Bybee's torture
analysis. It straightforwardly supports a core proposition of this article -
that use of evidence obtained through violations of the Third Geneva
Convention would violate a POWs rights under GC3 Article 102.'95
192 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 56-57 (emphasis added).
193 Citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding confessions procured by
means "revolting to the sense ofjustice" could not be used to secure a conviction).
194 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 57 (emphasis added). The
Working Group raises a number of other concerns including public reaction to methods of
interrogation, and "balancing the stated objective of open proceedings with the need not to
publicize interrogation techniques." Id.
195 "A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced
by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter
have been observed." Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 102.
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Following its analysis of domestic legal issues, the Working Group
discusses its view of problems with the interrogation techniques under
international law. It finesses the Presidential Declaration of inapplicability
with a statement that the law ...although not binding on the United States,
could be cited by other countries to support the proposition that the
interrogation techniques used by the U.S. contravene international legal
standards. While it says its purpose is to inform the DOD's policy
considerations when deciding how to treat unlawful combatants, the
discussion constitutes a clear and direct warning of the potential problems
arising from violations of the Third Geneva Convention.
ii. The Working Group's Analysis of the Effects of
Application of the Geneva Conventions
The Working Group notes that "to the extent that other nation states do
not concede the U.S. position,"' 19 6 Articles 13,197 14,198 17,199 130,200 and
196 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 57
197 Article 13 states:
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the
health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a
serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be
subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any
kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the
prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 13.
198 "Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their
honor." Id. at art. 14.
199 Article 17 states:
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or
serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. No physical or mental
torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse
to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Id. at art. 17.
200 Article 130 states:
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129201 may be relevant to considerations of interrogation techniques. The
Working Group warns that:
These articles of the Third Geneva Convention may provide an
opportunity for other States Parties to allege that they consider the United
States to be in violation of the Convention through its treatment of
detainees. To the extent any such treatment could be considered by them
to be torture or inhumane treatment, such acts could be considered
"grave breaches " and punishable as war crimes.20 2
Despite these warnings, the Working Group, operating on the
assumption that the Presidential Directive of inapplicability of GC3 is
mandatory, recommends an interrogation program containing many of the
"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in this Convention." Id. at art. 130.
201 "Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and
shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts." Id. at art.
129.
202 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 58. The Working Group also notes
that even if other States Parties concur that POW status is inapplicable they may still claim
coverage under Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Id.
The First Additional Protocol states:
[p]ersons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit
from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol
shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the
protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon
race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. Each
Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all
such persons.
Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 37, 16 I.L.M..1391 (1977) (prohibiting acts including violence to the life, health,
or physical or mental well-being of persons including murder, torture of all kinds, whether
physical or mental; corporal punishment; and mutilation; outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; taking of hostages; collective punishments;
and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts).
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elements previously discussed. It is, however, substantially limited in their
application.
iii. The Working Group's Recommended
Interrogation Techniques
The Working Group recommends limited use of many of the non-
standard techniques previously approved by Secretary' Rumsfeld but hedged
with numerous limitations, safeguards and caveats. Secretary Rumsfeld
suggested:
The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most
information from a detainee with the least intrusive method, always applied
in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained
investigators or interrogators. 204
The steps the Working Group proposes to ensure compliance with that
standard are enlightening, both because they circumscribe interrogator
conduct, and because they explain in clear terms the psychological and
emotional manipulation at the core of effective interrogation techniques.20 5
The Report notes that interrogations must consider "often interlocking
factors, such as . . . a detainee's emotional and physical strengths and
weaknesses ... [and] an assessment of possible approaches ... in an effort to
gain the trust of the detainee ...,206 They add:
Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the detainee's
emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation
operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted in close
cooperation with the units detaining the individuals. . . Detainee
interrogation involves a plan tailored to an individual and approved by
senior interrogators. Strict adherence to policies/standard operating
203 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 62-65; see text infra Appendix 4
(reproducing the list of techniques); see also FM 34-52, supra note 138 (presenting many of
the techniques discussed by the Working Group).
204 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, to James T. Hill, Commander,
U.S. Southern Command 5 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jun2004/d20040622doc9.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
205 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 62 (noting that interrogations
"must always be planned, deliberate actions..." with operating instructions "based on
command policies to ensure uniform, careful and safe application of any interrogations of
detainees" and adding this caveat: "While techniques are considered individually within this
analysis, it must be understood that in practice, techniques are usually used in combination;
the cumulative effect of all techniques used must be considered before any decisions are




procedures governing the administration techniques and oversight is
essential. 207
The Working Group's Report was a carefully drafted document, which
attempted to substantially limit and control potential abuses, and to re-cork,
as much as possible, the bottle from which the evil genie of prisoner abuse
had been released.2 °8  Unfortunately, even though Secretary Rumsfeld
approved the Working Group's Report, and implemented even further
restrictions, the damage to the carefully restricted intelligence interrogation
culture had already been inflicted; 20 9 damage which may prove to have had
fatal consequences.
iv. Secretary Rumsfeld's Approval
On April 16, 2002, after considering the Working Group's Report,
Secretary Rumsfeld informed the Commander of SOUTHCOM that he had
approved counter-resistance techniques limited to interrogations of
unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2 10 He declined to
approve some of the interrogation methods recommended by the Working
Group, including most of the methods in Categories I and II of the original
207 Id. (emphasis added).
208 It is most unfortunate that initial consideration of these matters gave short shrift to the
concerns expressed about potential adverse affects on military culture. The Bybee Memo's
rationale that the military will "do as it's told" reflects a substantial failure of civilian
authorities to comprehend the complex interplay among rules, culture, honor and duty in the
armed forces. Telling any human that a subset of his or her behavioral rules may be
dismissed with a wink is inherently unsettling to societal norms. In a closed society like the
military, the essential purpose of which is to provide closely regulated lethal force for
national defense, adherence to a moral code is essential. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 22-100
ARMY LEADERSHIP: BE, KNow, Do (Aug. 31, 1999) [hereinafter FM 22-100]; Fay Report,
supra note 133, at 111-12 ("Leaders must balance mission requirements with unit
capabilities, soldier morale and effectiveness. Protecting Soldiers from unnecessary pressure
to enhance mission effectiveness is a leader's job.").
209 Thus, for example, the Executive Summary of the Jones and Fay AR 15-6
Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigades notes that:
Confusion about what interrogation techniques were authorized resulted from the
proliferation of guidance and information from other theaters of operation;
individual interrogator experiences in other theaters; and, the failure to distinguish
between interrogation operations in the other theaters and Iraq. This confusion
contributed to the occurrence of some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses.
Fay Report, supra note 133, at Executive Summary 3.
210 Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 1-4; see text infra Appendix 5 (reproducing the
list of techniques) .The list of techniques is reproduced in Appendix 5.
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request,2 1 and noted that as to the methods of "Incentive/Removal of
Incentive," "Pride and Ego Down," "Mutt and Jeff," and "Isolation" the
Commander "must specifically determine that military necessity requires its
use and notify [Secretary Rumsfeld] in advance.',
212
The Department of Defense has verified that some of the techniques
eventually approved by Secretary Rumsfeld were used between December
2, 2002 and January 15, 2003.2 3 From January 16 until April 15, 2003,
interrogators at Guantanamo used FM 34-52 techniques with three added
Category I techniques: yelling, multiple interrogators and interrogator
214identity. They were applied by the Joint Task Force 170 at Guantanamo
under the Command of a Military Intelligence officer, Major General
Geoffrey Miller.21 5. Eventually they migrated 21 6 to Abu Ghraib Prison in
211 Compare Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 2-4, with WORKING GROUP REPORT,
Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 64-65. The methods eliminated from the Working Group
recommendations included Hooding; Mild Physical Contact; Threat of Transfer; Use of
Prolonged Interrogations; Forced Grooming; Prolonged Standing; Sleep deprivation;
Physical Training; Face slap/Stomach slap; Removal of Clothing; and Increasing Anxiety by
Use of Aversions. WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 64-65. Moreover,
Secretary Rumsfeld directs the SOUTHCOM commander: "If in your view, you require ...
additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique,
recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee."
Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 1.
212 Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 1-4.
213 Background Briefing, supra note 67 (noting that a Senior Defense Official stated: "I
believe that there were some techniques that eventually were approved were used in the
initial phase which began and then stopped.").
214 Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 108-09.
215 Joint Task Force 170 later became part of the redesigned Joint Task Force
Guantanamo. See Joint Task Force GTMO, supra note 149. General Miller assumed
command at Guantanamo in November 2002. Neil A. Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on
Harsh Methods at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A11. It is important to note
that MG Fay, in his AR 15-6 Report, specifically notes that:
There is no indication that the training provided by the JTF-GTMO Team led to
any new violations of the Geneva Conventions and the law of land warfare.
Training focused on screening, the use of pocket littler during interrogations,
prioritization of detainees, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning,
interpreter control, deception detection, reporting, automation, and interrogation
booths.
Fay Report, supra note 133, at 18.
216 Seymour Hersh claims in his book Chain of Command that the decision to use
extraordinary interrogation techniques in Iraq was made by Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence Stephen Cambone. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 60 (2004)
(quoting a Pentagon consultant as saying: "The White House subcontracted this to the
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Iraq,"' in some instances based on intentional command decisions, 2 1 in
some on cultural dispersion.2 9  As the Schlesinger Committee Report
notes:
Pentagon, and the Pentagon subcontracted it to Cambone, [and therefore] [t]his is
Cambone's deal, but Rumsfeld and Myers approved the program.").
217 In his AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade, LTG Anthony R. Jones determined that:
Interrogation techniques, including Counter-Resistance Techniques, were
developed and approved for the detainees in Guantanamo and Afghanistan who
were determined not to be EPWs or protected persons under the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. The OSD Memo promulgated in December 2002 [i.e. the
first Rumsfeld Order], approving techniques and safeguards for interrogation of
unlawful combatants in GTMO, included the use of dogs to induce stress and the
removal of clothing as Counter-Resistance techniques. This memo was rescinded
in January 2003. A General Counsel Interrogation Working Group was
subsequently formed and published a revised memo in April 2003 under the
signature of SECDEF on Counter-Resistance Techniques. This memo produced
by the Working Group and the techniques outlined in FM 34-52 were referenced
by Colonel Warren and his staff to develop the limits of authority memo for LTG
Sanchez. The provisions of Geneva Convention IV, Relative to Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, did apply to detainees in Iraq.
... [LTG Sanchez' memos on interrogation techniques] inadvertently, left certain
issues for interpretation: namely, the responsibility for clothing detainees, the use
of dogs in interrogation, and applicability of techniques to detainees who were not
categorized as "security detainees." Furthermore, some military intelligence
personnel executing their interrogation duties at Abu Ghraib had previously
served as interrogators in other theaters of operation, primarily Afghanistan and
GTMO. These prior interrogation experiences complicated understanding at the
interrogator level. The extent of "word of mouth" techniques that were passed to
the interrogators in Abu Ghraib by assistance teams from Guantanamo, Fort
Huachuca, or amongst themselves due to prior asignments is unclear and likely
impossible to determine. Jones Report, supra note 1, at 14-15.
218 According to the Schlesinger Committee Report:
MG Miller had indicated his model was approved only for Guantanamo.
However, CJTF-7 using reasoning from the President's Memorandum of
February 7, 2002, which addressed Aunlawful combatants, believed additional,
tougher measures were warranted because there were Aunlawful combatants
mixed in with Enemy Prisoners of War and civilian and criminal detainees. The
CJTF-7 Commander [i.e. LTG Sanchez], on the advice of his Staff judge
Advocate, believed he had the inherent authority of the Commander in a Theater
of War to promulgate such a policy and make determinations as to the
categorization of detainees under the Geneva Conventions. CENTCOM viewed
the CJTF-7 as unacceptably aggressive, and on October 12, 2003, [LTG Sanchez]
rescinded his September directive and disseminated methods only slightly
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[Extraordinary] interrogation techniques were authorized only [for use
against al Qaeda and the Taliban]. More important, their authorization in
Afghanistan and Guantanamo was possible only because the President
had determined that individuals subjected to these interrogation
techniques fell outside the strict protections of the Geneva
Conventions.
220
Thus, if the presidential determination was legally erroneous, the entire
structure crumbled. The first shockwaves of that collapse began at Abu
Ghraib.
d. The Taguba Report
2 21
General Sanchez stated in his testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee:
stronger than those in Field Manual 34-52. The policy memos promulgated at the
CJTF-7 level allowed for interpretation in several areas and did not adequately set
forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The existence of confusing and
inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the belief that
additional interrogation techniques were condoned.
Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 10 (emphasis added).
Note that CJTF-7 was Combined Joint Task Force 7, the forward deployed headquarters for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and commanded by LTG Ricardo Sanchez.
219 The Schlesinger Committtee Report notes:
Interrogation techniques intended only for Guantanamo came to be used in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Techniques employed at Guantanamo included the use of stress positions, isolation for
up to 30 days and removal of clothing. In Afghanistan techniques included removal of
clothing, isolating people for long periods of time, use of stress positions, exploiting fear of
dogs, and sleep and light deprivation. Interrogators in Iraq, already familiar with some of
these ideas, implemented them even prior to any policy guidance from CJTF-7. Id. at 68.
220 Id. at 82 (emphasis added); The Schlesinger Committee's reference to Afghanistan is
telling. The United States Army has charged MP SGT James P. Boland with permitting the
beating of one Afghan prisoner, and the shackling of another to the ceiling with his hands
above his shoulders. Carlotta Gall & David Rohde, Afghan Abuse Charges Raise New
Questions on Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at A10. Both prisoners at Bagram Air
Base, according to the charge sheet, later died in December, 2002. Id. According to the New
York Times, classified portions of an Army report [the Times story is unclear but the
reference is apparently to either the Taguba or Fay Reports] on Abu Ghraib stated that "In
Afghanistan, techniques included removal of clothing, isolating people for long periods of
time, use of stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs, and sleep and light deprivation." Id. The
classified portions of that report also identified as approved interrogation methods "shaving
their heads and beards" and "20 hour interrogations." Id.
221 Taguba Report, supra note 3, at 1.
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In September [2003], a team headed by General [Geoffrey] Miller
assessed our intelligence interrogation activities and human detention
operations. We reviewed the recommendations with the expressed
understanding, reinforced in conversations between General Miller and
me, that they might have to be modified for use in Iraq where the Geneva
Convention was fully applicable.222
After the revelation of sexual and physical abuse at Abu Ghraib, the
CENTOM commander appointed MG Antonio Taguba to conduct an
Article 15-6 investigation into the detention and internment operations of
the 800th Military Police Brigade ("The Taguba Report"). The Taguba
Report identified acts of intentional abuse of detainees by military police
officers which included: punching, slapping and kicking detainees andjumping on their bare feet; videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees; forcibly arranging detainees in sexually explicit positions
for photographing; forcing detainees to disrobe and keeping them naked for
several days at a time; forcing male detainees to wear women's underwear;
forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed;
arranging naked male detainees in a pile and jumping on them; positioning
a naked detainee on a box with a sandbag on his head and attaching wires to
his fingers, toes and penis to simulate electric torture; writing "I am a
rapist" on the leg of a detainee; placing a dog chain around a naked
detainee's neck and having a female soldier pose for a picture with him;
sexual intercourse with a female detainee; using unmuzzled military
working dogs to intimidate and frighten detainees with at least one severe
injury from a dog bite; and photographing dead Iraqi detainee.2 23 The
Report also accepted as credible detainees allegations of breaking chemical
lights and pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees; threatening detainees
with a pistol; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with
a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing
non-medical personnel to stitch a wounded detainee; and sodomizing a
detainee with a broom stick and possibly a chemical light.224
The Taguba Report, as well as some of the photographs which
precipitated it, came into the hands of American reporters and initiated the
chain of events discussed above.2 25 Following the appointment of MG
Taguba, a separate investigation was ordered by LTG Sanchez to
investigate the role of military intelligence personnel in abuses at Abu
222 General Ricardo Sanchez testimony before Senate Committee on Armed Services, 19
May, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39851-2004May 19.html.
223 Taguba Report, supra note 3, at 16-17.
224Id. at 17-18.
225 See text supra Part II.
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Ghraib.2 26 That investigation conducted by MG George R. Fay, and later
supplemented by appointment of LTG Anthony R. Jones, as an additional
investigating officer, resulted in the disclosure of substantial additional
information.
e. The Fay and Jones Reports
LTG Jones more closely examined the chain of command above the
205th M.I. Brigade. He determined that "[t]he chain of command directly
above the Brigade was not directly involved in the Abu Ghraib," but that
policy memoranda promulgated by LTG Ricardo Sanchez "led indirectly to
some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses," because they "allowed for
interpretation in several areas, including use of dogs and removal of
clothing. 227 He noted that:
Particularly, in light of the wide spectrum of interrogator
qualifications, maturity, and experiences (i.e. in GTMO and Afghanistan),
the memos did not adequately set forth the limits on interrogation
techniques.228
MG Fay's investigation, which was principally directed at the Brigade
level and below, was by its nature considerably more detailed. It identified
forty-four alleged instances or events of detainee abuse committed by
Military Police and Military Intelligence soldiers, as well as by civilian
contractors employed by the Army. Military Intelligence solicitation of MP
abuse included "the use of isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of
clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs as an interrogation tool and
physical abuse.,
229
MG Fay extensively discussed how extraordinary interrogation
techniques migrated from Guantanamo (GTMO) to Abu Ghraib:
Non-doctrinal approaches, techniques and practices were developed and
approved for use in Afghanistan and GTMO as part of the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT). These techniques, approaches and practices became
confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities
226 See Fay Report, supra note 133, at 1 (indicating that members of the 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, which had Abu Ghraib within its sphere of responsibility, were the
objects of the Fay investigation); see also U.S. ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 381-10: U.S.
ARMY INTELLIGENCE AcTvITrrEs 16 (July 1, 1984), available at
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r381_10.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter
AR 381-10] ("Procedure 15. Identifying, Investigating, and Reporting Questionable
Activities").
227 Jones Report, supra note 1, at 4, 16.
228 Id. atl6.
229 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 7.
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or safeguards. Soldiers were not trained on non-doctrinal interrogation
techniques such as sleep adjustment, isolation and the use of dogs. Many
interrogators and personnel overseeing interrogation operations at Abu
Ghraib had prior exposure to or experience in GTMO or Afghanistan.
Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non field-manual approaches came from
documents and personnel in GTMO and Afghanistan. 230
He then discussed those techniques in detail:
Physical and sexual abuses of detainees ... spanned from direct physical
assault such as...head blows rendering detainees unconscious to sexual
posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes
were the death of a detainee in [CIA] custody, an alleged rape committed
by a US translator, and the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee.
These abuses are, without question, criminal .... Such abuse can not be
directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment
of detainees .... The environment created at Abu Ghriab contributed to
the occurrence of such abuse and the fact that it remained undiscovered
by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as nakedness
and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise), carried over into
sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and
unspervised Soldiers and civilians.3
In additional to the physical and sexual abuse, MG Fay identified three
principal areas of detainee mistreatment. Those were the use of dogs, nudity
and isolation:
Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs
arrived at Abu Ghraib . . . Dog teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a
result of recommendations from MG G. Miller's assessment team from
230 Id. at 8; see Douglas Jehl, The Reach of War: Abu Ghraib Scandal; Army's Report
Faults General in Prison Abuse, NY TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2004, at Al. According to the New
York Times, a classified section of the Fay Report sheds new light on the role played by a
secretive Special Operations Forces/Central Intelligence Agency task force that operated in
Iraq and Afghanistan as a source of interrogation procedures that were put into effect at Abu
Ghraib. It says that a July 15, 2003, "Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility Policy,"
drafted for use by Joint Task Force 121, which was given the task of locating former
government members in Iraq, was adopted "almost verbatim" by the 519th Military
Intelligence Battalion, which played a leading role in interrogations at Abu Ghraib.
That task force policy endorsed the use of stress positions during harsh interrogation
procedures, the use of dogs, yelling, loud music, light control, isolation and other procedures
used previously in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id.
231 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 9-10 (emphasis added). It is of interest to note that MG
Fay specifically does not say they cannot be indirectly tied to those policies.
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GTMO. MG G. Miller recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee
custody and control issues. Interrogations at Abu Ghraib, however, were
influenced by several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of
dogs. The use of dogs in interrogations to Afear up detainees was utilized
without proper authorization.
The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain
the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed at Abu
Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced
through Afghanistan and GTMO. As interrogation operations in Iraq
began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and
deployed in other theaters in support of GWOT... The lines of authority
and prior legal opinions blurred.... The use of clothing as an incentive
(nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating "de-
humanization" of the detainees and set the stage for additional and more
severe abuses to occur.
. . . LTG Sanchez approved the extended use of isolation on several
occasions, intending for the detainee to be kept apart, without
communication with their fellow detainees. The technique employed in
several instances was not, however, segregation but rather isolation-the
complete removal from outside contact other than required care and
feeding by MP guards and interrogation by MI .... [Lack of] proper
training, clear guidance or experience . . . stretched the bounds into
further abuse; sensory deprivation and unsafe or unhealthy living
conditions. Detainees were sometimes placed in excessively cold or hot
cells with limited or poor ventilation or light.
232
The Fay Report summarizes detainee abuse in several categories
including: 1) physical abuse including slapping, kicking, twisting hands,
restricting breathing, poking an injury and forcing an internee to stand
while handcuffed in such a way as to dislocate his shoulder,233 2) use of
dogs to threaten and terrify detainees,234 3) humiliating and degrading
treatment including nakedness,235 photographs in undress and degrading
232 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
233 The similarity to torture techniques used by the North Vietnamese against captured
American pilots is disturbing. Although nothing as extreme as the odious nature of the North
Vietnamese treatment is alleged, the difference seems to be one of degree rather than moral
culpability. See STUART I. ROCHESTER & FREDERICK KILEY, HONOR BOUND: AMERICAN
PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-1973, at 144-148 (1998).
234 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 83. The Fay Report says that interrogations at Abu
Ghraib were influenced by "several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of
dogs." Id. The document lists an 11 October 2002 JTF 170 memorandum. Id.
235 Id. at 87. The Fay Report notes that "removal of clothing was not a technique
developed at Abu Ghraib but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced
through Afghanistan and GTMO." Id. The Fay Report adds:
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positions, forcing detainees into simulated sexual positions,23 ' 4) improper
use of isolation, 5) failure to safeguard detainees, and 6) failure to report
detainee abuse.
238
2. Other Sources of Information about Alleged Abuses
In addition to official reports, allegations of and information about
abuse has surfaced from several sources in the press. Those include claims
by former prisoners, publicized reports by the International Committee of
the Red Cross, and reports of continuing prosecutions of military personnel
for abuse especially involving Afghanistan.239 In addition, in September
[At GTMO Secretary Rumsfeld] granted this authority on 2 Dec. 2002, but it was rescinded
six weeks later in January, 2003 .... As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form,
it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters and in
support of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations
in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. Soldiers simply
carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. Id. at 88.
236 Id. at 71-72. The Fay Report draws a causal connection between extraordinary
interrogation techniques and sexual abuse. "The climate created at Abu Ghraib provided the
opportunity for such abuse to occur and continue undiscovered.... What started as
undressing and humiliation, stress and physical training, carried over into sexual and
physical assaultsby a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and
civilians. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
237 Sen. McCain says of his imprisonment in North Vietnam that "It's an awful thing,
solitary. It crushes your spirit and weakens your resistance more effectively than any other
form of mistreatment." JOHN MCCArN & MARK SALTER, FAITH OF MY FATHERS 206 (1999).
238 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 68-69.
239 The Afghan claims are particularly enlightening because they deal with treatment of
detainees classified as unlawful combatants under the same Presidential Order as those at
Guantanamo. From the limited amount of information revealed in the Abu Ghraib related
reports, it appears extraordinary interrogation techniques were applied to detainees in at least
some instances. Some of those persons may have been captured after the capture of Kabul,
and the installation of the Kharzai government. As long, however, as effective resistance
continues in Afghanistan under the Taliban leadership, and as long as they maintain armed
forces "in the field," the Third Geneva Convention should continue to apply. See Hague
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
42, 36 Stat. 2277, I Bevans 631 ("Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised."); cf. Rev. Mons. Sebastiao
Francisco Xavier dos Remedios Monteiro v. The State of Goa, All India Reporter 1970 SC
329 (March 26) ("There is however difference between true annexation on the one hand and
premature annexation or as it is sometimes called 'anticipated annexation' on the other.
Annexation is premature so long as hostilities are continuing and there is an opposing army
in the field even if the Occupied Power is wholly excluded from the territory. Anticipated
annexation by unilateral action is not true annexation. True annexation is only so when the
territory is conquered and subjugated.").
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2004, Seymour Hersh published Chain of Command which contains a
number of other specific allegations of mistreatment and misconduct.24 °
According to the Fay Report:
The ICRC found a high level of depression, helplessness, stress and
frustration especially by those detainees in isolation. Detainees made the
following allegations during interviews with the ICRC: threats during
interrogation; insults and verbal insults during transfer in Tier 1A; sleep
deprivation; walking in the corridors handcuffed and naked, except for
female underwear over the head; handcuffing either to the upper bed bars
or doors of the cell for 3-4 hours. Some detainees presented physical
marks and psychological symptoms which were compatible with these
allegations. Also noted were brutality upon capture, physical or
psychological coercion during interrogation, prolonged isolation, and
excessive and disproportionate use of force.24'
Of particular interest to the ICRC was the status of a detainee kept "in
a totally darkened cell, measuring about 2 meters long, and less than a
meter across, devoid of any window, latrine or water tap, or bedding.242 On
the cell door was the inscription "the Gollum with a picture of the character
from the Tolkien film trilogy.
243
Press stories about Red Cross Reports also indicated the existence of
abuses:
On the military side, a key focus is Army Col. Thomas Pappas,
commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. A controversial
order last fall put Pappas in overall charge of Abu Ghraib on Nov. 19.
The abuse of prisoners had already begun there, however, and Army Maj.
Gen. Thomas Romig, Army judge advocate general, told a congressional
hearing last week that the search for culpable officers may encompass
others.
Red Cross inspectors who visited Abu Ghraib in early October 2003 and
found many of the abuses that have since come to light spoke to an
unnamed military intelligence officer before Pappas took command of the
240 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 1-72.
241 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 64-65.
242 Id. at 66. The Fay Report also refers to an isolation "Hole," which subjected detainees
to excessive cold in the winter and heat in the summer. "There was obviously poor air
quality, no monitoring of time limits, no frequent checks on physical condition of the
detainee, and no medical screening, all of which added up to detainee abuse." Id at 93.
243 Id. The Fay Report says that the only response to ICRC complains about Abu Ghraib
was a letter from BG Janice Karpinski dated December 24, 2003. The letter, the Report
noted "tends to gloss over, close to the point of denying the inhumane treatment,
humiliation, and abuse identified by the ICRC."
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prison. Romig told members of Congress last week, "Clearly ... we'd like
to know who that was." Red Cross reports are kept confidential to prevent
publicity-averse governments from denying the organization access to
prisons around the world. Key witnesses are often not named.2 "
Some claims of abuse have been made in the press by former
prisoners. For example, three Britons freed from Guantanamo Bay claimed
they suffered systematic brutality and sexual humiliation during their
detention at the U.S. military base. 245 A report released by their lawyers
said prisoners at Guantanamo were stripped naked and forced to watch
videotapes of other prisoners who had been ordered to sodomize each other.
It also says one of the men was questioned with a gun to his head.246
Similar charges have been made by other prisoners.24 7
244 John Diamond & Toni Locy, Military intelligence, CIA Officers Under Scrutiny, USA
TODAY, May 16, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-16-
prison-probe x.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
245 But see Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Detainees Deliver Intelligence Gains, NY TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2004, at 18 ("The [American] officials denied the specific allegations of
mistreatment made by prisoners recently returned to Britain whose accounts appeared in
British newspapers and from Afghans who spoke to The New York Times in Kabul. Their
accounts detail enforced privation, petty cruelty, beatings and planned humiliations.").
246 See Britons Once Held by US. Claim Brutality, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2004,
available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5602003 (last visited Apr. 4, 2005); see also
Shafiq Rasul Letter, supra note 147.
247 A Pakistani on-line press report claims that:
A Tunisian detainee testified other day before a U.S. military review hearing that
he was abused while in captivity in Afghanistan before being brought to the
prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, a military official said.
The 35-year-old Tunisian told the review panel he was held in the dark and
without sufficient drinking water for more than two months in Afghanistan, said a
military officer who served as the tribunal recorder and whose identity was barred
from being disclosed.
Military officials said the detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance before
being turned over to U.S. troops. The man didn't specify which force was holding
him at the time of the alleged mistreatment, but he told the panel the experience
led him to falsely confess to training with militants, the tribunal official said.
The Tunisian told the panel he made the false confessions due to the
"mistreatment he had received in Afghanistan, or as he phrased it, torture," the
officer said.
Detainee Says He Was Abused in Afghanistan, PAKTRIBUNE, Aug. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=73523 (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
For similar reports regarding operation "Enduring Freedom," see "Enduring Freedom"
Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, HuM. RTS. WATCH, Mar. 2004, available at
http:/ihrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/afghanistan0304.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
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In addition, reports of prosecutions arising from treatment of detainees
in Afghanistan, especially by Special Operations forces, provide some
potentially useful information. Thus, for example, charges against four
Navy SEALs, involving abuse of a prisoner who later died, may result in
248testimony. The same applies to the charges against a civilian contractor
for the CIA, David Passaro, who was recently indicted in Raleigh, N.C. for
the beating death of an Afghan prisoner.249
Finally, Seymour Hersh revealed additional facts in his Chain of
Command 250 According to Hersh, in the late summer of 2002 a CIA
analyst visited Guantanamo and interviewed at least thirty detainees. Hersh
quotes one of the analyst's colleagues:
Based on his sample, more than half the people there didn't belong
there. He found people lying in the own feces, including two captives,
perhaps in their eighties, who were clearly suffering from dementia.
Hersh claims that U.S. claims of providing a minimum of three hours
of recreation a week to Guantanamo captives are, in some cases, not in
compliance with the spirit of the Third Geneva Convention:
252
For the tough cases ... in mid-2002, at recreation time some prisoners
would be strapped into heavy jackets, similar to straitjackets, with their
arms locked behind them and their legs straddled by straps. Goggles
were placed over their eyes and their heads covered with a hood. The
prisoner was then led at midday into what looked like a narrow fenced-in
dog run ... and given his hour of recreation. The restraints forced him to
move, if he chose to move, on his knees, bent over at a forty-five degree
angle. Most prisoners just sat and suffered in the heat.253
141 See Eric Schmitt, 4 Navy Commandos Are Charged in Abuse, NY TIMES, Sept. 4,
2004, at A6.
249 Terry Frieden, U.S. Indicts CIA Contractor in Afghanistan Prison Death, CNN, June
22, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/17/afghan.indictment/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2005).
250 See generally HERSH, supra note 216. As is his practice, Mr. Hersh, a long-standing
investigative journalist who first broke the My Lai story, did not reveal confidential sources.
Given his history of accuracy, however, the author feels confident in at least adding them to
the facts discussed here, especially since they are consistent with the pattern of events
revealed in official investigations to date.
251 Id. at 2.
252 Hersh's discussion does not indicate whether a distinction was made among detainees
based on their status as Taliban, al Qaeda, or otherwise. It is, accordingly, impossible to
determine on these facts whether this recreation was provided to persons arguably covered
by the Third Geneva Convention.
253 Id. at 11-12. Hersh says his informant claims photographs of the procedure exist.
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In another example, Hersh quotes a former Marine guard at
Guantanamo who says he was encouraged by his squad leader to visit
detainees "one or two times a month":
We tried to fuck with them as much as we could inflict a little bit of pain.
. .."There were always newspeople there," he said. "That's why you
couldn't send them back with a broken leg or so. And if somebody died,
I'd get court-martialed." The roughing up of prisoners was sometimes
spur-of-the-moment, the former Marine said... One pastime was to put
hoods on the prisoners and "drive them around the camp in a Humvee,
making turns so they didn't know where they were." The prisoners
would talk during the rides, the former Marine said, but "we didn't know
what they were saying." I wasn't trying to get information. I was just
having a little fun - playing mind control.254
Hersh also discussed the exhibition to the press of John Walker Lindh
who was stripped, gagged, strapped to a board and exhibited to the press.255He quotes an affidavit by Lindh's attorney, James Brosnahan:
a group of armed American soldiers blindfolded Mr. Lindh, and took
several pictures of Mr. Lindh and themselves with Mr. Lindh. In one, the
soldiers scrawled Ashithead across Mr. Lindh's forehead and posed with
him...Another told Mr. Lindh that he was going to hang' for his actions
and that after he was dead the soldiers would sell the photographs and
256give the money to a Christian organization.
Following the delivery of this paper in October, 2004, additional facts
were revealed which demonstrate that many of the claims of mistreatment
and abuse were, in fact, true, and that many of the denials of such abuse
254 Id. at 12-13.
255 Id. at 4. Lindh was one of the "American Talibans."
256 HERSH, supra note 216, at 37. Hersh claims that the photographing of prisoners both in
Afghanistan and Iraq seems to have been part of the dehumanizing interrogation process. Id.
at 38-39. He quotes Gary Myers, the attorney for one of the Abu Ghraib MPs, as saying:
"Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own?"
Hersh claims that "the notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation
had become a talking point among pro-war Washington conservatives." Hersh bases his
claim on The Arab Mind, a 1973 book by Raphael Patai. Hersh continues: "The Patai book,
an academic told me, was 'the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior.' In their discussions,
[the academic] said, two themes emerged - "one, that Arabs only understood force, and two,
that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation." Id. at 39.
Hersh's claim for the source of this interrogation approach is interesting, if speculative. It
adds weight to the need for any full investigation to determine the bases upon which it was
designed, if only because it indicates potential criminal liability for persons engaged in
developing the process.
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were potentially suspect. Those facts were developed through three
principal sources: documents obtained under Freedom of Information Act
Requests and released by the American Civil Liberties Union 257; a Report
prepared by Naval Inspector General Albert T. Church 258; and additional
news reports of criminal investigations and charges against American
personnel for alleged prisoner abuse at Guantanamo, or in Afghanistan or
Iraq.2
59
Revelation of that misconduct provides additional support for a close
legal analysis of the status of individuals who claim mistreatment. To the
extent that any of them qualify for protection under the Third Geneva
Convention the legal implications for those who may bear command
responsibility for Geneva violations may be quite important.
B. The Legal Analysis of Interrogation Techniques
Three principle defenses of the use of interrogation techniques outside
FM 34-52 have been made public. They are the OLC Memorandum of
August 1, 2002 to Alberto Gonzales, the JAG Brief by LTC Beaver of
October 11, 2002, and the Working Group Report of April 4, 2003. These
principle defenses share what the author considers to be a similar analytical
defect; each presumes that the Third Geneva Convention is inapplicable to
all Guantanamo detainees.
257 See Government Documents on Torture: Freedom of Information Act, Mar. 25, 2005,
at http://www.aclu.org/Internationallntemational.cfin?ID=13962&c=36 (last visited Apr. 4,
2005). These documents include e-mails from agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
expressing concern that interrogators from the department of Defense impersonated FBI
agents and used "torture" tactics that might be attributed to the FBI. See Email from
censored party, to Gary Bald, et al, FWD: Impersonating FBI at GTMO, Dec. 5, 2003, at
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_3977.pdf. Note the similarity to interrogation
techniques discussed before the Senate during the McCarthy/Malmady investigations. See
Wallach, Procedural and Evidentiary Rules, supra note 35. The documents also include
concern about "abusive interrogation techniques." See Detainee Interviews (Abusive
Interrogation Issues), at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4194.pdf (last visited
Apr. 4, 2005).
258 VICE ADMIRAL ALBERT T. CHURCH III, ExEcuTtvE SUMMARY OF REPORT ON DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE (DOD) INTERROGATION OPERATIONS, available at http://www.defenselink.mil
/news/Mar2005/ d200503 1Oexe.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) (full draft unavailable at time
of review). In the Executive Summary, ADM Church revealed the existence of at least some
substantiated abuse cases, although a number appeared to be absent.
259 Revelations seem to occur on almost a daily basis. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Pentagon
Seeks To Shift Inmates From Cuba Base, NY TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at Al; Douglas Jehl,
Army Details Scale ofAbuse In Afghan Jail, NY TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at Al; Douglas Jehl




1. The Bybee Memorandum of August 1, 2002
On August 1, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee provided a
Memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales ("Bybee Memo
11).260 The Bybee Memo II examines the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and its
implementation in 18 United States Code §§ 2340-2340A. It devotes
considerable effort to distinguishing torture, which it agrees is usuall
61
banned, from "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." 26  It
points out, for example, that "both the European Court on Human Rights
and the Israeli Supreme Court have recognized a wide array of acts that
constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, but do not
amount to torture."263
Of particular note here is that the Bybee Memo II almost entirely
ignores the Third Geneva Convention. While there is some discussion of
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which deals with
conflicts not of an international character),264 the Bybee Memo II concludes
260 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130.
261 But see id. § V, at 31 (arguing at length that the powers of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, authorize conduct which would be otherwise illegal, if necessary to
the defense of the United States)
262 Compare, e.g., id. at 15 n.8 (analyzing the reservations placed by the U.S. on its
ratification of the Torture convention), with id. at 21-22 & 27-31 (analyzing the intention of
the enabling domestic legislation); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (defining torture).
263 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 31. The Bybee Memo II discusses the 1978 case
Ireland v. United Kingdom, in which the ECHR considered interrogation methods which
included 1) wall standing where the prisoner leaned against a wall standing on his toes and
with all his weight on his fingers, 2) continuous hooding except during interrogation, 3)
subjection to loud and continuous noise, 4) sleep deprivation pending interrogation and 5)
deprivation of food and drink through a reduced diet during and pending interrogation. Id. at
29; see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 41 (1976). The Bybee
Memo notes that the ECHR concluded "that the techniques produce 'intense physical and
mental suffering' and 'acute psychiatric disturbances,' [but] they were not [sic] sufficient
intensity or cruelty to amount to torture." Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 30.
The Bybee Memo also discusses Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel.
Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 30. In that case, the Israeli Supreme Court considered
five interrogation methods which included forceful shaking, stress positioning with an
opaque hood and loud music, crouching stress positions, excessively tight handcuffs, and
sleep deprivation. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471, at
para. 9 (1999). The Bybee Memo notes: "While the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that
these acts amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment, the court did not expressly find that
they amounted to torture." Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 30.
264 See, e.g., Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 15 n.8. This footnote refers to a to-date
unpublished Memorandum from James C. Ho to John C. Yoo regarding the possible
interpretations of common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the
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its discussion on GC3 by stating that "the standards of conduct established
by common article 3 of Convention III, do not apply to 'an armed conflict
between a nation-state and a transnational terrorist organization.'265
More importantly for the concerns discussed in this article, the entire
discussion of the more general protections applied to POWs is found in a
short footnote. That footnote states, in pertinent part:
While Article 17 of [GC3] places restrictions on interrogation of enemy
combatants, members of al Qaeda and the Taliban militia are not legally
entitled to the status of prisoners of war as defined in the Convention.
266
The restrictions of Article 17 are, of course, much broader than torture
alone. In effect, the Bybee Memo II makes the case that, whether they are
torture, or merely "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,"
certainly the interrogation techniques of Categories II and III constitute
prohibited conduct when applied to POWs protected under the Article 17's
prohibitions not just against physical and mental torture, but also against
threats, insults, or "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind. 267
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Memorandum from James C. Ho, Attorney-Advisor, Office
of Legal Counsel, to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel (Feb. 1, 2002).
265 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 15 n.8. The statement is certainly correct within its
limitations. The questions presented by the invasion of Afghanistan in pursuit of a terrorist
organization, however, have other and more complex ramifications, as discussed above.
266 Id. at 38 n.22 (citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J.
Haynes II, General Counsel,Department of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002)). Article 17 of GC3
states in part:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners
of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse
to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17.
267 The Bybee Memo II was, to some extent, repudiated by the administration as pure
legal analysis for hypothetical purposes when it was leaked to the public. See supra Part
VI.A.l.b.i and the more extensive legal analysis infra Part VI.C. 1. In addition, GC3 has
separate restrictions on solitary confinement as punishment. See Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 4, at art. 90.
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2. The Working Group Report
The Working Group's Report contains considerable analysis of the
interplay of prisoner of war status with interrogation techniques.268 As
noted above, however, it operates from the central premise that it is bound
by the Presidential Directive mandating the inapplicability of GC3. Despite
those ground rules, however, the participants managed to openly articulate
their concerns that violations of the Third Geneva Convention could be
found in the extraordinary interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo.269
It is the author's belief that those concerns were well-founded. If, as
appears likely from the facts adduced above, persons protected by GC3
were questioned using Category II and III techniques, if they were
subjected to intentional humiliation, denied their religious rights, placed in
solitary confinement, or any number of the other techniques discussed
above,27° the Working Group was indeed well advised to express its doubts.
3. The Beaver Brief of October 11, 2002
Another legal Memorandum of importance here is the Legal Brief on
Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies271 which accompanied the Request
for Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies.272  JTF Staff Judge
Advocate LTC Diane Beaver stated as a factual predicate to her analysis
that "[t]he detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay Cuba ...are not
protected by the Geneva Conventions. 2 73 She noted that:
While the procedures outlined in [Army FM 34-52] are utilized, they are
constrained by, and conform to the GC and applicable international law,
and therefore are not binding. Since the detainees are not EPWs, the
Geneva Conventions limitations that ordinarily would govern captured
enemy personnel interrogations are not binding on U.S. personnel
conducting detainee interrogations at GTMO.274
268 The analysis operates under the rubric that other states might take the position the
Third Geneva Convention applied, as well as for purposes of determining potential legal
problems. See WORKING GRouP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 4, 68.
269 Id.
270 See discussion infra Part VI.C.
271 Beaver Memo, supra note 139, at part Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies.
272 d. at part Request for Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies.
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Consequently, LTC Beaver looked to other international law including
the Convention Against Torture, as well as to U.S. domestic law, to
determine the legality of the proposed interrogation techniques. She
concluded in part that, "An international law analysis is not required for the
current proposal because the Geneva Conventions do not apply to these
detainees since they are not EPWs. '275 If any detainee was, in fact, entitled
to protection under the Third Geneva Convention, her analysis is, of course,
incomplete.
C. Analysis of the Legal Justification of the Techniques
To the extent the legal justification for application of extraordinary
interrogation techniques ignores the requirements of Third Geneva
Convention it is fatally flawed. Almost all the attorneys who dealt with this
question, however, did exactly that. The Beaver Brief,276 the Working
277 278Group Report,277 and the Schlesinger Committee Report, all were
premised on the assumption that the Third Geneva Convention was
inapplicable to detainees from Afghanistan. They all based that assumption
on President Bush's February 2002 Order.279  That Order, however, is
legally flawed, and a battlefield detainee, at least from the Taliban, is, in
fact, entitled to the presumption of POW status.
280
In every case where the Article 5 presumption entitles a detainee to
POW rights until his status is determined by a competent tribunal, the use
of interrogation tactics which violate those rights is itself a war crime.28' In
some instances, it may well constitute a grave breach.282
275 Id. at 5, para. 4.
276 Beaver Memo, supra note 139, at part Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies.
277 Working Group Report, Apr. 4, supra note 36.
278 Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13.
279 Presidential Order, supra note 63.
280 See discussion supra at Part V.A. The author finds it, quite literally, incredible that no
consideration was given to the legal effects of failure to provide an AR 190-8(6) tribunal.
Somewhere, a memo must exist.
28 1 For example, acts of intimidation under Article 13, failure to respect their person under
Article 14, insults or exposure to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind
under Article 17, failure to provide or allow retention of religious under Article 34, and
denial of basic standards of treatment under Article 126. Third Geneva Convention, supra
note 4, at arts. 13, 14, 17, 34, 126.
282 Article 130 includes as grave breaches "torture or inhuman treatment ...[and] wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health." Id. at art. 130. To the extent a
reviewing court found that extraordinary interrogation techniques either constituted torture
or inhuman treatment, or that separately, they caused great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, even if they did not amount to torture or inhuman treatment per se, it would
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1. Under The Third Geneva Convention283 Application of a Number
of the Extraordinary Interrogation Techniques May Constitute
War Crimes
As the Article 15-6 reports discussed above set out in detail, the
extraordinary interrogation techniques developed for use and applied
against al Qaeda and the Taliban consist of general categories including
physical and emotional abuse, environmental manipulation, and solitary
confinement. Each of those categories included activities which violate the
rights of POWs under the Third Geneva Convention.
a. Physical and Emotional Abuse Clearly Violates GC3
The POW Convention makes it clear that individuals and military units
may not set their own standards for treatment of captured enemy soldiers.284
Any unlawful act or omission which causes death or seriously endangers
the health of a POW is a grave breach, 285 and POWs are "entitled in all
circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor.' '286  Finally,
prisoners of war may not be physically or mentally tortured, threatened,
insulted or exposed to unpleasant treatment to obtain information.287
seem obligated to find a grave breach. The existence of defenses is a matter for separate
analysis. See discussion infra.
283 This article deals solely with the status and rights of prisoners of war and is thus
principally concerned with discussion of the Third Geneva Convention. Because of the
much wider mix of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the AR 15-6 reports and the Schlesinger
Committee Report also dealt with the Fourth (Civilians) Geneva Convention. They are, in
many respects, similar regarding fundamental rights.
284 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12 (providing: "Prisoners of war are in
the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured
them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is
responsible for the treatment given them.").
285 Article 13 of GC3 states:
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the
health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a
serious breach of the present Convention ....
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts
of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. Id. at art. 13.
286 Id. at art.14.
287 Article 17 of GC3 states:
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The extraordinary interrogation conduct revealed at Guantanamo and
in Afghanistan against detained individuals is facially illegal as applied
against prisoners of war.288  While beatings and sexual assaults at Abu
Ghraib were roundly condemned by investigators, it has become clear that
physical abuse was. a part of detainee interrogations, at least in Afghanistan
and that it exceeded mere shoving, light slapping and finger pointing.28
The principal conduct violating GC3, however, appears to be mental abuse
and humiliation. 290  It includes, inter alia, forcing men into homosexual
positions and simulated acts, into wearing women's clothing, exposing
them unclothed to women, and photographing those acts. 29' That abuse
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or
serial number, or failing this, equivalent information ....
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted,
or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Id. at art. 17.
288 Iraq requires no analysis to determine violations. The detainees are admittedly
covered, and the Article 15-6 reports discuss the violations in detail. The only exception is
their failure to recognize that confinement of POWs with criminal populations (the reports
repeatedly refer to the "mix" at Abu Ghraib) is a separate violation of GC3. See id. at art. 22
("Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves,
they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.")
289 A number of military personnel have been charged with severe physical abuse from
incidents in Afghanistan. See supra notes 247-49. In addition, prisoners released from
Guantanamo allege beatings. See supra notes 246-47. The latter are currently largely
unsubstantiated.
290 In its discussion of military intelligence interrogations of Iraqi police officers at Abu
Ghraib, the Fay Report notes: "The [Iraqi Police] were kept in various stages of dress,
including nakedness, for prolonged periods as they were interrogated. This constitutes
humiliation which is detainee abuse." Fay Report, supra note 133, at 56 (emphasis added).
Humiliating treatment is specifically banned by the Geneva Conventions.
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all
protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in
whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion
or political opinion. GCIV, supra note 137, at art. 27.
291 Some of those acts, of course, were denounced by authorities as unauthorized
perversions. Nevertheless, there is a common element among all which is inescapable, i.e.
the attempt to degrade a prisoner's resistance though manipulation of sexual taboos.
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appears designed to be particularly offensive to the cultural and sexual
292
mores of conservative Moslem prisoners.
It is quite clear that for that reason, the extraordinary interrogation
techniques include indecent exposure in various forms, forced shaving, and
the refusal to allow prisoners access to religious clothing, paraphenalia and
literature.
During transit to Guantanamo, prisoners were shaved, stripped of their
religious garb293 and forced to wear orange coveralls.294 POWs have an




Detainees in both Guantanamo/Afghanistan and Iraq were
subjected to various forms of environmental manipulation which violated
the Third Geneva Convention. Those include sleep deprivation, light
292 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 13 ("[Pjrisoners of war must at all
times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults
and public curiosity.").
293 See id. at art 34 (stating: "Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise
of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that
they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities. Adequate
premises shall be provided where religious services may be held.").
294 Article 46 governs transport of prisoners of war to different facilities:
The Detaining Power, when deciding upon the transfer of prisoners of war,
shall take into account the interests of the prisoners themselves, more especially
so as not to increase the difficulty of their repatriation.
The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in
conditions not less favorable than those under which the forces of the Detaining
Power are transferred. Account shall always be taken of the climatic conditions to
which the prisoners of war are accustomed and the conditions of transfer shall in
no case be prejudicial to their health.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient
food and drinking water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary
clothing, shelter and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take adequate
precautions especially in case of transport by sea or by air, to ensure their safety
during transfer, and shall draw up a complete list of all transferred prisoners
before their departure. Id. at art. 46 (emphasis added).
295 Article 18 of GC3 states:
All effects and articles of personal use ... shall remain in the possession of
prisoners of war ... Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall
likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to
their regulation military equipment . . . articles having above all a personal or
sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war. Id. at art. 18.
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deprivation, 296  cell temperature adjustments, loud music and light
adjustments.297
c. Solitary Confinement
A number of detainees were subjected to solitary confinement, not as
punishment for rule infractions, but rather as a means of interrogation. That
confinement is a direct violation of the Third Geneva Convention.298 It was
also, at least as reported by Generals Taguba and Fay, and as claimed by the
ICRC,2 99 anecdotally by reports from ex-prisoners,3 °° often done in
conjunction with environmental manipulation in the confinement facilities.
In sum, to facilitate the breaking of a prisoner, the prisoner was, at
least on occasion, left alone in a dark and dank or sweltering cell, for days
or weeks at a time. The similarity to prior mistreatment of Americans held
as POWs in three Asian wars - World War II in the Pacific,3°' Korea, °2 and
296 Id. at art. 87 (stating in part that "imprisonment in premises without daylight [is]
forbidden").
297 Article 25 of GC3 states:
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the
forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said
conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and
shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners
of war as regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general
installations, bedding and blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively,
shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted...
Id at art. 25.
298 See id. at art. 21 (providing, in part, that "prisoners of war may not be held in close
confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the
continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary"); Id at art. 90
(limiting, in a complementary fashion, confinement for punishment to no more than thirty
days with a further limitation that when further disciplinary punishment is imposed, "a
period of at least three days must elapse between the execution of any two of the
punishments, if the duration of one of these is ten days or more.")
299 See notes 239-43.
300 See notes 244-51.
301 See Telegram from Huddle, Secretary of State to the Charge in Switzerland, Japanese
Treatment of American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees (Jan. 8, 1945), in VI
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 316 (1945).
302 See LEWIS H. CARLSON, REMEMBERED PRISONERS OF A FORGOTTEN WAR: AN ORAL
HISTORY OF KOREAN WAR POWs (St. Martin's Press 2002) (1945).
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Vietnam, 303 mistreatment against which we violently protested30 4 - is
despicable.
Finally, and in addition to those systematic breaches, required
information about detainees was not provided.30 5 Detainees were denied
access to representatives of the ICRC,3 °6 and in at least some instances in
Iraq, they were hidden from ICRC inspections.
307
303 ROCHESTER & KiLEY, supra note 233.
304 See, e.g., Statement by William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Treatment of American Prisoners of War in North Viet-Nam, in 61
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 596 (1969).
305 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 70 ("Immediately upon capture, or
not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in case
of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to
write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency
provided for in Article 123..."). Article 122 of the GC3 states:
Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties
to the conflict shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war
who are in its power.. Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to
the conflict shall give its Bureau the information referred to in the fourth, fifth and
sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding any enemy person belonging to one of
the categories referred to in Article 4, who has fallen into its power. . .This
information shall make it possible quickly to advise the next of kin concerned.
Subject to the provisions of Article 17, the information shall include, in so far as
available to the Information Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his
surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number, place and
full date of birth, indication of the Power on which he depends, first name of the
father and maiden name of the mother, name and address of the person to be
informed and the address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.
Id. at art. 122.
AR 190-8 at § 1-7 articulates the information collection, storage and transmission
requirements for the US National Prisoner of War Information Center. AR 190-8, supra note
90, at § 1-7(c)(1). In addition to requiring the NPWIC to collect and store Geneva
Convention required information on EPWs and retained persons, it requires, inter alia, that
the NPWIC "[o]btain and store information concerning [civilian internees] and [other
detainees] who are kept in the custody of U.S. Armed Forces..." Id.
306 Article 126 of GC3 states:
Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go
to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment,
imprisonment and labour, and shall have access to all premises occupied by
prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to go to the places of departure,
passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to
interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without
witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
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All of this conduct, to the extent that it was perpetrated upon prisoners
of war, is a breach of the Third Geneva Convention; some constitute grave
breaches 30 8 punishable by all signatory powers. 30 9 Much of it is punishable
Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to
select the places they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits
shall not be restricted. Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of
imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary
measure.
The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the
same prerogatives._The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the
approval of the Power detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 126 (emphasis added).
307The Fay Report notes, as an example of so called "ghost detainees":
For example, the CIA interned three Saudi national medical personnel working
for the coalition in Iraq. CIA officers placed them in Abu Ghraib under false
names. The Saudi General in charge of the men asked U.S. authorities to check
the records for them. A search of all databases using their true names came back
negative. Ambassador Bremer then requested a search, which produced the same
results .... Ultimately [...] Colin Powell requested a search, and as with the other
requestors, had to be told the three men were not known to be in U.S. custody.
Shortly after the search for the Secretary of State, a JDIC official recalled that
CIA officers once brought three men together into the facility. A quick discussion
with the detainees disclosed their true names, which matched the name search
requests, and the men were eventually released.
Fay Report, supra note 133, at 53-54 (citation omitted).
308 Article 130 of GC3 provides that:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the
Convention: wilful [sic] killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully [sic] causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or
wilfully [sic] depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in this Convention. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art.
130.
309 Article 129 provides in part:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the
following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
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under federal criminal law,310 the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 311 and
international law.312 In addition to the factual argument that detainees are
not prisoners of war, the Yoo and Bybee Memos raised arguments relating
to American constitutional law and other conventions.3  While those
discussions are not applicable in this analysis of GC3 protections, certain
potential defenses may be raised, and should at least, be examined.
2. Extraordinary Interrogation Techniques May Constitute Other
Crimes
While extensive discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it is
worth mentioning that in addition to the direct criminality of breaching the
Third Geneva Convention, other domestic and international criminal
violations may be implicated.
a. U.S. Domestic Law
Violations of U.S. domestic law may arise from these facts both under
military law doctrines and under criminal law applicable to all American
citizens.
i. Military Law
Within the ambit of military law, the command responsibility doctrine
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice would have application to
uniformed service members involved in the development and application of
any illegal interrogation or detention.314
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case. Id. at art. 129.
310 See discussion infra Part VI.C.2.a (discussing the War Crimes Act and federal
conspiracy law).
311 See discussion infra Part VI.C.2.a; see also supra note 120 (discussing the Yamashita
case).
312 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
313 See supra Part IV.
314 See supra note 131. The Working Group Report presents this issue comprehensively
and lists potential charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, among which are,
inter alia, Cruelty, Oppression or Maltreatment, Article 93; Reckless Endangerment, Article
134; Assault, Article 128; Involuntary Manslaughter, Article 119; Unpremeditated Murder,
Article 118; Disobedience of Orders, Article 92; Dereliction of Duty, Article 92; and
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The "principle of 'command responsibility' that holds a superior
responsible for the actions of subordinates appears to be well accepted in
U.S. and international law in connection with acts committed in wartime..
,,315 That is because "a commander clearly must be held responsible for
those matters which he knows to be of serious import and with respect to
which he assumes personal charge. Any other conclusion would render
essentially meaningless and unenforceable the concepts of great command
responsibility accompanying senior positions of authority.,
31
The essence of that point in both military and international law was
articulated by a U.S. military tribunal in the High Command Case:
Under basic principles of command authority and responsibility, an
officer who merely stands by while his subordinates execute a criminal
order of his superiors which he knows is criminal violates a moral
obligation under international law. By doing nothing he cannot wash his
hands of international responsibility...
[The authority, both administrative and military, of a commander and
his criminal responsibility are related but by no means coextensive.]
Criminality does not attach to every individual in the chain of command ....
There must be a personal dereliction that can occur only where the act is
directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his
subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it
must be personal negligence amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of
the actions of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.31 7
A number of other charges or crimes more directly analogous to
civilian criminal law are also possibilities, 318 as well, of course, as standard
criminal charges under Title 18 of the United States Code and federal
common law.
Maiming, Article 124. WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 45-47 (citing
relevant articles from Uniform Code of Military Justice).
315 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3rd 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996).
316 Koster v. United States, 685 F.2d 407, 410 (1982).
317 Case No. 12: U.S. v. von Leeb (High Command Case), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10. NUREMBERG, OCTOBER 1946 - APRIL 1949, at 512 (1953); but see Yamashita v.
Styer, 327 U.S. 1, at 15 (affirming command responsibility on a considerably lower
standard).
318 See supra note 131; WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 7-19 (citing




ii. Possible Criminal Liability Under Civilian Law
An agreement by officials, acting under color of law, to commit grave
breaches of the Third Geneva Convention would seem to involve, at the
least, violations of the War Crimes Act 319 and federal conspiracy law.
The Yoo/Delahunty and Gonzales Memos320 devote considerable time
to raising the specter of prosecution under the War Crimes Act. Their
refutation of its applicability rests solely on the argument that the Third
Geneva Convention does not protect members of the Taliban or al Qaeda.321
If a grave breach does exist, then the language of the statute seems to create
aprimafacie case in the circumstances here discussed.322 In addition, there
also seems to be a separate possibility of a conspiracy charge.
Federal conspiracy law is premised on the concept that a conspiracy is
a distinct evil which, because it provides a unique synergy to the crime
unavailable from individuals acting alone, is separately punishable. 323 That
enhanced criminality is especially true in the case of government
officials, 324 and if that criminal enterprise constitutes an international delict
in the name of a national government, the policy reasons for the theory's
application seem even more enhanced.325 In addition, once the conspiracy
is joined, conduct arising from it, even if unforeseen, may create liability
for all the conspirators.
319 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1997).
320 See supra Part IV.
321 See id.
322 The War Crimes Act says, in part, that "[w]hoever [is a U.S. national and] ... commits
a [grave breach of the Third Geneva Convention] ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned for life
or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the
penalty of death." 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (1997).
323 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961); see also United States v.
Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (stating that "[t]he essence of a conspiracy is an
agreement to commit an unlawful act.").
324 See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
325 See, e.g., the Indictment in the "Doctors Trial: The Medical Case of the Subsequent
Nuremberg Proceedings":
The United States of America, by the undersigned Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes, duly appointed to represent said Government in the prosecution of war criminals,
charges that the defendants herein participated in a common design or conspiracy to commit
and did commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in Control Council Law
No. 10, duly enacted by the Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945.
Case No. 1: U.S. v. Brandt (Medical Case), in I TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRmUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10. NUREMBERG,
OCTOBER 1946 - APRIL 1949, at 8 (1953), available at http://www.ushmm.org/research/
doctors/indiptx.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
326 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
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Thus, to the extent that the Office of Legal Counsel and White House
counsel erred in their analysis of the applicability of the Third Geneva
Convention to prisoners captured on Afghan battlefields, and those errors
led to grave breaches, they may have created a snare of immense
proportions.327 They may also have implications in international realms.
b. Other International Law
This article is not a survey, but it bears mentioning that in addition to
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment328 to which the White House Memos devoted so
much space, 329 there are also possible violations of international law
punishable in a number of arenas. Those include the classic common plan
conspiracy of the post World War II trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo, 330 and
the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of signatory states under the
Third Geneva Convention itself.
3 1
327 The availability of an advice of counsel defense in a conspiracy action might defend on
good faith reliance. Cf United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1195
(2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that "[iun order to convict a defendant of conspiracy or mail fraud,
the government must prove that he had the specific intent to commit the crime charged.").
Here, good faith might be difficult to find where the JAGs, service counsel, and Department
of State were in overt disagreement with Yoo/Delahunty and Gonzales, and where it appears
the military lawyers were "cut out of the loop" because their advice was unwelcome. It was
the author's experience as a civil litigator, that when "train wrecks" occurred because of
counsel's advice, quite often counsel had been informed of the result sought before the
advice was rendered.
328 See Torture Convention, supra note 6.
329 See supra Part IV. The author tends to agree with the Government Memos' argument
that the United States reservation on constitutional definitions of torture may limit
applicability of the Torture Convention. It is questionable, however, whether the reservation
limits action by other states signatory, or whether it stretches anywhere nearly as widely as
the Memos' claim. The severe and permanent harm standard argued for by Judge Bybee
sounds more like a defense counsels brief on appeal than a neutral memorandum of law.
330 See Jordan Paust, The Common Plan to Violate the Geneva Conventions, JURIST, May
25, 2004, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/paust2.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
331 Article 129 of GC3 provides in part:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 129.
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An additional interesting question is the possibility of International
Criminal Court ("ICC") jurisdiction, a consummation devoutly opposed by
two presidential generations.332 To the extent that a state is unable or
unwilling to prosecute its own war criminals, ICC jurisdiction may attach
where an appropriate complaint is filed by a signatory state.3 33 If the OLC
interpretation of Presidential powers is correct, and binding upon the courts
of the United States, it may have the unintended consequence of creating
international jurisdiction separate from that required by the Third Geneva
Convention.
334
None of this is to say that defenses or mitigating facts may not exist.
At least some of the circumstances here were unique, and the United States
was clearly the victim of an unlawful attack by international criminals
harbored, inter alia, in the Afghan hills. It is difficult to imagine though,
their applicability in circumstances as widely, cavalierly, and improperly
applied as the extraordinary interrogation techniques used on persons
covered by the Geneva Conventions.
332 See, e.g., Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Int'l Operations, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 37-38 (1998)
(statement of Michael Scharf, Professor of Law, and Director, Center for International Law
and Policy, New England School of Law), available at http://www.access.gpo.
gov/congress/senate/senate I Ish 105.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
333 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/ CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute] (providing in part that
"[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes [and] [f]or the
purpose of this Statute, 'war crimes' means: [g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949."); ld at art. 13 (providing in part that "[tihe Court may exercise its
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions
of this Statute if: [a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party."); Id. at art. 17 (providing in part
that "the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: [t]he case is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."); see also,
Anthony Dworkin, International Criminal Court to be Launched in July, CRIMES OF WAR
PROJECT, Apr. 15, 2002, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-icc.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
334 The situation is somewhat analogous to that which would exist if a President exercised
constitutional pardon authority to block the ability of U.S. courts to prosecute a government
official under the War Crimes Act. The binding nature of the pardon authority on the U.S.
Courts is indisputable; the consequences might create ICC jurisdiction. See generally,
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Todd David Peterson, The Congressional Power Over
Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1225 (2003).
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3. Possible Defenses or Circumstances in Mitigation
In the circumstances involving application of extraordinary
interrogation techniques to the Taliban and al Qaeda, additional legal
defenses or alleged mitigating factors may involve a necessity defense, a
claim of superior orders, and some sort of ratification argument. All would,
of course, be intensely fact driven, and each would require assertion on a
case by case basis.
The Yoo/Delahunty and Bybee memoranda discussed the necessity
defense at length. It is available under the law of war in certain limited
circumstances, 335 and is probably not best approached on the analytical
basis in which necessity is considered in the standard problematical
approach to law of war issues. Rather, given the mandatory nature of the
Third Geneva Convention, and the open invitation for abuses, it would
seem any exception should be strictly limited, if permitted at all.
The claim of superior orders337 was rejected as an absolute defense at
Nuremburg 338 but may still have validity either as a defense in limited
circumstances, 339 or in mitigation.
340
335 See, for example, the law governing siege (at least where Protocol I is inapplicable)
which allowed conduct, otherwise illegal, under a necessity rubric. Final Report of the
United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992): Annex VI.B, The Battle of Sarajevo and the Law of Armed Conflict,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I) (1994), at Part VIII. (stating that "[s]ubject to article
17 of the Geneva Civilians Convention, which encourages the conclusion of local
agreements for removal of some persons from besieged areas, and article 23 of the Civilians
Convention, which provides for the free passage of medical and religious supplies for all
persons and of essential food for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity
cases, the commander of the investing force has the right to forbid all communications and
access between the besieged place and the outside. Simply put, under the law as it existed
prior to Protocol I, the investing force was, generally speaking, entitled to starve, freeze, or
dehydrate the inhabitants of a besieged area into submission.").
336 That is to say, as one of the guiding principles identified by the commentators. See,
e.g., Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, PART III: LAW OF WAR ON
LAND, § 3, at 2 (1958).
337 See Charles Garraway, Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice
Delivered or Justice Denied, 836 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 785 (1998), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpListl 75/4F89CC080CEOE792C 1256B66005
DD767 (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
338 See Nuremburg Principles, supra note 99.
339 See JOINT SERVICE COMMrrrEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
(2000), Rule 916(d), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm200O.pdf (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005) (stating that "[i]t is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting
pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary
sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.").
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Finally, the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum appears to contain some sort
of theory of ratification.341 That is, the authors seems to believe that by
issuing an order under what they claim is his implied constitutional powers,
President Bush has made the military actions of his subordinates, which are
necessary to carry out those powers, inherently legal.342
These possible defense arguments notwithstanding, it appears to the
author that certain conclusions may be drawn from the facts and law
developed above.
VII. The Symbiotic Relationship of Tribunals, Applicability of the Geneva
Convention, and Improper Interrogation Techniques
To date, it appears beyond doubt that the United States has applied
interrogation techniques, which are illegal under the Third Geneva
Convention, to some captured persons who have at least a reasonable
argument that they are within its protection. These facts, and the law
discussed above, show a pattern of development with certain threads
running through it.
First, well before any publicly revealed analytical memoranda
established an argument that the Taliban were unlawful combatants,
President Bush had signed an Order establishing military tribunals which
applied an evidence rule which permitted the use of information obtained
through means which would subject the information to exclusion in a court
martial or U.S. district court. The White House, the Department of Justice,
and civilian authorities in the Department of Defense appear to have
fiercely rejected any attempts by uniformed lawyers to delete that rule.
Second, a small group of OLC lawyers seem to have developed both
the legal justifications for non-application of the Third Geneva Convention
to the Taliban and the legal analysis which permitted the use of
interrogation techniques against Guantanamo detainees in violation of the
Convention.
Third, some of the techniques developed for use against Taliban
detainees, and applied to them at Guantanamo, were indeed in violation of
the rights of a POW under the Third Geneva Convention.
Fourth, a number of the extraordinary interrogation techniques
developed, approved and applied were specifically designed to exploit
340 See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, art. 8, available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/war.term/trib_02.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (stating that
"[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall
not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
Tribunal determines that justice so requires.").
341 See discussion supra Part IV.
342 Id.
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cultural and religious susceptibilities of conservative Afghan Moslems.
The use of nudity, dogs, shaving of beards, and denial of religious
paraphernalia were all intended to intimidate and humiliate Moslem
detainees.
343
Fifth, at least some cross-fertilization between Guantanamo and Iraq
occurred when Major General Geoffrey Miller advised in August and
September 2003, when MG Miller led a team to assess Iraqi Theater ability
to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence using Guantanamo
procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines, and when
Guantanamo interrogation procedures were promulgated by LTG Ricardo
Sanchez. Additional military cultural degradation was caused by confusion
among military police and military intelligence personnel with Guantanamo
and/or Afghan connections, regarding the applicability and rules of the
Geneva Conventions in Iraq.
Sixth, in the context of persons protected by the Third Geneva
Convention, the use of dogs and nudity at Abu Ghraib were an extension of
the already illegal techniques developed for Guantanamo to soften Moslem
detainees for interrogation. The use of sexual assault, including indecent
exposure and forced cross-dressing, was not necessarily such an extension,
but it was reasonably foreseeable where prison guards were tasked to
intimidate and humiliate detainees based upon their cultural and sexual
taboos.
Seventh, under the circumstances, the doctrine of command
responsibility and the law of conspiracy must both be examined for their
applicability. To the extent that a commander knew or should have known
that his or her subordinates were engaged in unlawful conduct, or failed to
adequately investigate and remedy abuses, command responsibility may
create liability. In the civilian context, where government officials
operating under color of law have entered into an agreement to violate a
federal law,344 all persons who joined in that agreement are liable for all
reasonably foreseeable violations of law which were done in its
furtherance. 345 Thus, even if a superior authority had ordered only some
343 See Seymour Hersh, who notes:
Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the
Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law, and it is humiliating for
men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle
Eastern studies at New York University explained. "Being put on top of each
other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other-it's all a form
of torture," Haykel said. HERSH, supra note 216, at 23-24.
344 See, e.g., note 319 and accompanying text (discussing the War Crimes Act).
345 Thus, for example, a civilian order to apply extraordinary interrogation techniques at
Guantanamo, if applied to a person who was, in fact, protected by the Third Geneva
Convention, might result in a grave breach. A similar analysis could apply to use of a
military commission to try a POW. If, as would be necessary, that decision was carried out
[Vol. 36:541
THE LOGICAL NEXUS
violations, the commission of others by his subordinates might still create
liability.346
Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to discern a logical
nexus among these factors. The continued refusal to apply an exclusionary
rule, even in the review panels created by Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz,
which demonstrates a continuing desire to obtain information with the
advance knowledge that it might be considered illegally extracted by a
court acting under the rule of law, combined with the continuous and
connected application of interrogation techniques in violation of the Third
Geneva Convention, appears to be more than coincidence.
VIII. Conclusion
This article has dealt with a relatively narrow issue, but that issue has
extraordinary implications for the future of the rule of law, both in the
United States and internationally. On the one hand, it concerns only the
application of the sweeping protection, arising out of the global panoramas
of the Second World War, to benighted tribal warriors who might, if they
were aware of its existence, cheerfully deny its benefits to captured
enemies. On the other, it threatens the hard won protection, such as it is,
which remains the slim reed at which the captured soldier, airman, or
marine may grasp in his or her time of deepest despair.
More importantly, it deals with the commitment by states to interpret
their solemn obligations in good faith, when military advantage, and
perhaps the general welfare of the home front, dictate otherwise. How
convenient it would have been for the British to have tortured captured
Luftwaffe air crew to determine the next target. How tempting for the
United States to have threatened the Afrika Korps tanker to discern enemy
plans. By and large, though, in times of the gravest national peril, the West
stood fast against such misconduct.
Surely reciprocity counted. For much of the war, the Germans held
our own as prisoners in at least equal numbers. But it was not reciprocity
alone. National ideals, global public opinion, military culture, and what are
now termed "obsolete concepts of chivalry" all mattered.347
by an official's subordinates, the predicate acts for a conspiracy charge could be present
under applicable precedent.
346 There should also, at some point, be a defense available. Where the command
authority eventually issued orders rescinding prior interrogation techniques, and instituting
safeguards, the decision to continue to apply those techniques and ignore the safeguards
might be reasonably unforeseeable. That would, of course, be a determination for a trier of
fact.
347 Article 5 of GC3 requires that POW status be determined in cases of doubt "by a
competent tribunal" rather than by, inter alia, executive fiat. This provision surely reflects
the drafters' belief that reciprocity and chivalry, as well as a certain empathy, would be
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In its dry language, the Fay Report is damning:
[The Department of Defenses'] development of multiple policies on
interrogation operations for use in different theaters of operations
confused Army and civilian Interrogators at Abu Ghraib. ... National
policy and DoD directives were not completely consistent with Army
doctrine concerning detainee treatment or interrogation tactics, resulting
in CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policies and practices that
lacked basis in Army interrogation doctrine. As a result, interrogators at
Abu Ghraib, employed non-doctrinal approaches that conflicted with
other DoD and Army regulatory, doctrinal and procedural guidance.
348
Those who sow the wind should not be surprised at what they reap.
The Third Geneva Convention was written in the light of the still glowing
embers of Nazi death camps. Millions of POWs had perished there because
of race, religion, and ethnicity. 349 They had been subjected to that regime
despite the strictures of the 1929 Geneva Convention, not merely because
of Germany's disregard for the law, but also because of her perversion of its
provisions.
At war's end, the world resolved to do better. The Third 1949 Geneva
Convention was the child of that resolution. Its presumptions and
protections are not mere words, they are not charming relicts of a bygone
era, and they are not obsolete. We disregard their strictures not merely at
our peril, both legal and moral, but more importantly at the peril of our
military personnel, in service and yet unborn.
Who sets such precedents bears a heavy responsibility to remember
what happens when we do battle with monsters. After the Abu Ghraib story
broke, President Bush addressed the key issues in this article:
America stands against and will not tolerate torture. We will investigate
and prosecute all acts of torture and undertake to prevent other cruel and
unusual punishment in all territory under our jurisdiction. American
present in the minds of military officers examining facts to determine the fate of a captured
warrior. Certainly, the experience of Allied POWs in Nazi Germany sometimes bore that
out. See, e.g., HENRY CHANCELLOR, COLDITZ: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WORLD WAR II'S
GREAT ESCAPES, 126-127 (2001) ("All the prisoners who encountered the military court
were impressed by the fairness of the senior German officers who sat on it.").
348 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 112-13 (emphasis added).
349 Not to mention the abysmal treatment of the Japanese of all their prisoners, whatever
their race or creed.
350 See Fay Report, supra note 133, at Executive Summary 5 (stating that
"[s]oldiers/Sailors/Airmen!Marines should never be put in a position that potentially puts
them at risk for non-compliance with the Geneva Convention or Laws of Land Warfare.").
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personnel are required to comply with all U.S. laws, including the United
States Constitution, Federal statutes, including statutes prohibiting torture,
and our treaty obligations with respect to the treatment of all detainees.
The United States also remains steadfastly committed to upholding the
Geneva Conventions, which have been the bedrock of protection in armed
conflict for more than 50 years. These Conventions provide important
protections designed to reduce human suffering in armed conflict. We
expect other nations to treat our service members and civilians in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Our Armed Forces are
committed to complying with them and to holding accountable those in
our military who do not.
351
That commitment by the Armed Forces of the United States to holding
accountable violators of the Geneva Conventions is consistent with our
history and values. Does it extend beyond the military to hold responsible
all who conceived, ordered and abetted such violations; no matter how high
their office?
The abyss is gazing back at us.
35 2
351 Press Release, Bush Commemorates U.N. Day to Support Torture Victims (June 26,
2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Jun/28-403335.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005) (emphasis added).
352 As we began this article with a quotation about doing battle with monsters, so let us
end it. Winston Churchill, speaking as First Lord of the Admiralty in a radio broadcast on
January 20, 1940, stated:
Very few wars have been won by mere numbers alone. Quality, willpower,
geographical advantages, natural and financial resources, the command of the sea,
and, above all, a cause which rouses the spontaneous surgings of the human spirit
in millions of hearts-these have proved to be the decisive factors in the human
story. If it was otherwise, how would the race of men have risen above the apes;
how otherwise would they have conquered and extirpated the dragons and
monsters; how would they have evolved the moral theme; how would they have
marched forward across the centuries to broad conceptions of compassion, of
freedom, and of right? THE WAR SITUATION (BBC Broadcast, Jan. 20, 1940),
available at http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Joybells.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005).
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Appendix 1





5. Fear Up Harsh
6. Fear Up Mild
7. Decreased Fear Down
8. Pride and Ego Up
9. Pride and Ego Down
10. Futility Technique
11. We Know All
12. Establish Your Identity
13. Repetition
14. File and Dossier




Interrogation Techniques Requested By Joint Task Force 170 on October
11, 2002. 3
Category I Techniques
1) Yelling at the detainee (Not directly in his ear or at the level it would
cause physical pain or hearing problems)
2) Techniques of deception:
a) Multiple-interrogator techniques
b) Interrogator-identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a
citizen of a foreign nation or as an Interrogator from a country
with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.
353 For a complete description of these techniques, see FM 34-52, supra note 138, at
appendix H.




1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours.
2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made to
[sic] through the OIC, Isolation Section, to the Director, Joint
Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must
be approved by the Commanding General. For selected detainees, the
OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee,
to include medical visits of a non-emergent [sic] nature.355
4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard
interrogation booth.
5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
6) The detainee may have a hood placed over his head during transportation
and questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and
the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.
7) The use of 20 hour interrogations.
8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.
10) Removal of clothing.
11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair etc.).
12) Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce
stress.
Category I1 Techniques
Techniques in this category may be used only by submitting a request
through the Director, JIG, for approval by the Commanding General with
appropriate legal review and information to Commander, USSOUTHCOM.
These techniques are required for a very small percentage of the most
uncooperative detainees (less than 3%).356 The following techniques, and
other aversive techniques, such as those used in U.S. military interrogation
resistance training or by other U.S. government agencies, may be utilized in
a carefully coordinated manner to help interrogate exceptionally resistant
detainees. Any of these techniques that require more than light grabbing,
poking or pushing, will be administered only by individuals specifically
trained in their safe application.
355 Author's note: This statement seems to imply that isolation may be used for more than
a limited category of selected detainees.
356Author's note: This statement seems to imply that Category I and II techniques are
required for more than 3 per cent of detainees.
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1) The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death
or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or
his family.
2) Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical
monitoring).
3) Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the
misperception of suffocation.
4) Use of mild non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing,
poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.
Appendix 3
Interrogation Techniques Approved by the Secretary of Defense
The Interrogation Techniques Requested by Joint Task Force 170 on
October 11, 2002 were forwarded by General James T. Hill, Commanding
General of the Southern Command to General Richard Myers, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation that he believed Categories
I and II were "legal and humane." He noted, however, that:
I am uncertain whether all the techniques in the third category are legal
under U.S. law, given the absence of judicial interpretation of the US
torture statute. I am particularly troubled by the use of implied or
expressed threats of death of the detainee or his family. However, I
desire to have as many option as possible at my disposal and therefore
request that Department of defense and department of Justice lawyers
review the third category of techniques._
On 2 December, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved 357 an Action Memo
from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the DOD.358 His approval
permitted the use of counter-resistance techniques at Guantanamo limited to
categories I and II and the fourth technique in Category 111.
359
Accordingly, the interrogation techniques approved and implemented
for Guantanamo on December 2, 2002, were as follows:
357 Haynes Memo, supra note 162 (on which Secretary Rumsfeld added a handwritten
note that "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?").
358 id.
359 Mr. Haynes noted that he had discussed the issue with his deputy Douglas Feith and
General Myers and that they "[ ... believe that, as a matter of policy, a blanket approval of
Category III techniques is not warranted at this time. Our Armed Forces are trained to a




1) Yelling at the detainee (Not directly in his ear or at the level it would
cause physical pain or hearing problems)
2) Techniques of deception:
a) Multiple-interrogator techniques
b) Interrogator-identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a
citizen of a foreign nation or as an Interrogator from a country
with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.
Category II Techniques:
1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours.
2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made to
[sic] through the OIC, Isolation Section, to the Director, Joint
Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be
approved by the Commanding General. For selected detainees 360, the
OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee,
to include medical visits of a non-emergent [sic] nature.
4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard
interrogation booth.
5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
6) The detainee may have a hood placed over his head during transportation
and questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and
the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.
7) The use of 20 hour interrogations.
8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.
10) Removal of clothing.
11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair etc.).
12) Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce
stress.
Category III Techniques:
1) Use of mild non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in
the chest with the finger, and light pushing.
360 Author's note: This statement seems to imply that isolation may be used for more than
a limited category of selected detainees.
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Appendix 4
Interrogation Techniques Recommended By the DOD Working Group
Report of April 4, 2003361
1. Direct: Asking straightforward questions.
2. Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a
privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention,
from detainees. (Privileges above and beyond POW-required
privileges).
3. Emotional Love: Playing on the love a detainee has for an individual or
group.
4. Emotional Hate: Playing on the hate a detainee has for an individual or
group.
5. Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee.
6. Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a detainee.
7. Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a detainee.
8. Pride and Ego Up: Boosting the ego of a detainee.
9. Pride and Ego Down: Attacking and insulting the ego of a detainee, not
beyond the limits that would apply to a POW.
10. Futility: Invoking the feeling of futility of a detainee.
11. We Know All: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator knows the
answer to questions he asks the detainee.
12. Establish Your Identity: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator
has mistaken the detainee for someone else.
13. Repetition Approach: Continuously repeating the same question to the
detainee within interrogation periods of normal duration.
14. File and Dossier: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator has a
damning and inaccurate file, which must be fixed.
15. Mutt and Jeff: A team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator.
The harsh interrogator might employ the Pride and Ego Down
technique.
16. Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing detainee
to answer.
17. Silence: Staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort.
18. Change of Scenery Up: Removing the detainee from the standard
interrogation setting (generally to a location more pleasant, but no
worse).
19: Change of Scenery Down: Removing the Detainee from the standard
interrogation setting and placing him in a setting that may be less
361 See supra note 203.
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comfortable; would not constitute a substantial change in
environmental quality.
20: Hooding: This techniques is questioning the detainee with a blindfold in
place. For interrogation purposes, the blindfold is not on other than
during interrogation.
21: Mild Physical Contact: Lightly touching a detainee or lightly poking the
detainee in a completely non-injurious manner. This also includes
softly grabbing of shoulders to get the detainee's attention or to comfort
the detainee.
22: Dietary Manipulation: Changing the diet of a detainee; no intended
deprivation of food or water; no adverse medical or cultural effect and
without intent to deprive subject of food or water, e.g., hot rations to
MREs.
23: Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment to create
moderate discomfort (e.g. adjusting temperature or introducing an
unpleasant smell). Conditions would not be such that they would injure
the detainee. Detainee would be accompanied by interrogator at all
times.
24: Sleep Adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee (e.g.
reversing sleep cycles from night today.) This technique is NOT sleep
deprivation.
25: False Flag: Convincing the detainee that individuals from a country
other than the United states are interrogating him.
26: Threat of Transfer: Threatening to transfer the subject to a 3 rd country
that subject is likely to fear would subject him to torture or death. (The
threat would not be acted upon nor would the threat include any
information beyond the naming of the receiving country).
The following list includes additional techniques that are considered
effective by interrogators, some of which have been requested by
USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM. They are more aggressive counter-
resistance techniques that may be appropriate for detainees who are
extremely resistant to the above techniques, and who the interrogators
strongly believe have vital information. All of the following techniques
indicate the need for technique-specialized training and written procedures
to insure the safety of all persons, along with appropriate, specified levels
of approval and notification for each technique.
27: Isolation: Isolating the detainee from other detainees while still
complying with basic standards of treatment.
28: Use of Prolonged Interrogations: The continued use of a series of
approaches that extend over a long period of time (e.g., 20 hours per
day per interrogation).
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29: Forced Grooming: Forcing a detainee to shave hair or beard. (Force
applied with intention to avoid injury. Would not use force that would
cause serious injury.)
30: Prolonged Standing: Lengthy standing in a Anormal position (non-
stress). This has been successful, but should never make the detainee
exhausted to the point of weakness or collapse. Not enforced by
physical restraints. Not to exceed four hours on a 24-hour period.
31: Sleep deprivation: Keeping the detainee awake for an extended period
of time. (Allowing individual to rest briefly and then awakening hi,
repeatedly.) Not to exceed 4 days in succession.
32: Physical Training: Requiring detainees to exercise (perform ordinary
physical exercises actions) (e.g. running, jumping jacks); not to exceed
15 minutes in a two-hour period; not more than two cycles, per 24-hour
periods), Assists in generating compliance and fatiguing the detainees.
No enforced complaince.
33: Face slap/Stomach slap: A quick glancing slap to the fleshy part of the
cheek or stomach. These techniques are used strictly as shock measures
and do not cause pain or injury. They are only effective if used once or
twice together. After the second time on a detainee, it will lose the
shock effect. Limited to two slaps per application; no more than two
applications per interrogation.
34: Removal of Clothing: Potential removal of all clothing; removal to be
done by military police if not agree to by the subject. Creating a feeling
of helplessness and dependence. This technique must be monitored to
ensure the environmental conditions are such that this technique does
not injure the detainee.
35: Increasing Anxiety by Use of Aversions: Introducing factors that of
themselves create anxiety but do not create terror or mental trauma
(e.g., simple presence of dog without directly threatening action). This
technique requires the commander to develop specific and detailed
safeguards to insure the detainee's safety.
Appendix 5
Interrogation Techniques Approved By Secretary Rumsfeld on April 16,
2003
A. Direct: Asking straightforward questions.
B. Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a
privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention,
from detainees. (Privileges above and beyond POW-required
privileges). Caution: Other nations that believe that detainees are
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entitled to POW protections 362 may consider that provision and retention
of religious items (e.g. the Koran) are protected under international
law. 363  Although the provisions of the Geneva Convention are not
applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration
should be given to these views prior to application of this technique.
C. Emotional Love: Playing on the love a detainee has for an individual or
group.
D. Emotional Hate: Playing on the hate a detainee has for an individual or
group.
E. Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee.
F. Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a detainee.
G. Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a detainee.
H. Pride and Ego Up: Boosting the ego of a detainee.
I. Pride and Ego Down: Attacking and insulting the ego of a detainee, not
beyond the limits that would apply to a POW. Caution: Article 17 of
Geneva III provides, "Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be
threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.''364 Other nations that believe that detainees are
entitled to POW protections may consider this technique inconsistent
with the provisions of Geneva. Although the provisions of Geneva are
not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration
should be given to these views prior to application of this technique.
J. Futility: Invoking the feeling of futility of a detainee.
K. We Know All: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator knows the
answer to questions he asks the detainee.
L. Establish Your Identity: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator
has mistaken the detainee for someone else.
M. Repetition Approach: Continuously repeating the same question to the
detainee within interrogation periods of normal duration.
N. File and Dossier: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator has a
damning and inaccurate file, which must be fixed.
0. Mutt and Jeff: A team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator.
The harsh interrogator might employ the Pride and Ego Down technique.
Caution: Other nations that believe that POW protections apply to may
consider this technique as inconsistent with Geneva III, Article 13 which
provides that POWs must be protected against acts of intimidation.
362 Author's Note: As does the International Committee of the Red Cross. See Richard
Waddington, Guantanamo Inmates Are POWs Despite Bush Views - ICRC, REUTERS, Feb.
8, 2002, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0208-04.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2005).
363 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 34.
3 Id. at art. 17.
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Although the provisions of Geneva are not applicable to the
interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to
these views prior to application of this technique.]
P. Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing detainee to
answer.
Q. Silence: Staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort.
R. Change of Scenery Up: Removing the detainee from the standard
interrogation setting (generally to a location more pleasant, but no
worse).
S: Change of Scenery Down: Removing the Detainee from the standard
interrogation setting and placing him in a setting that may be less
comfortable; would not constitute a substantial change in environmental
quality.
T: Dietary Manipulation: Changing the diet of a detainee; no intended
deprivation of food or water; no adverse medical or cultural effect and
without intent to deprive subject of food or water, e.g., hot rations to
MREs.
U: Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment to create
moderate discomfort (e.g. adjusting temperature or introducing an
unpleasant smell). Conditions would not be such that they would injure
the detainee. Detainee would be accompanied by interrogator at all
times. [Caution: Based on court cases in other countries, some nations
may view application of this technique in certain circumstances to be
inhumane. Consideration of these views should be given prior to use of
this technique.
V: Sleep Adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee (e.g.
reversing sleep cycles from night today.) This technique is NOT sleep
deprivation.
W: False Flag: Convincing the detainee that individuals from a country
other than the United states are interrogating him
The following list includes additional techniques that are considered
effective by interrogators, some of which have been requested by
USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM. They are more aggressive counter-
resistance techniques that may be appropriate for detainees who are
extremely resistant to the above techniques, and who the interrogators
strongly believe have vital information. All of the following techniques
indicate the need for technique-specialized training and written procedures
to insure the safety of all persons, along with appropriate, specified levels
of approval and notification for each technique.
X: Isolation: Isolating the detainee from other detainees while still
complying with basic standards of treatment. [Caution: The use of
isolation as an interrogation technique requires detailed implementation
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instructions, including specific guidelines regarding the length of
isolation, medical and psychological review, and approval for extensions
of the length of isolation by the appropriate level in the chain of
command. This technique is not known to have been generally used for
interrogation purposes for longer than 30 days. Those nations that
believe detainees are subject to POW protections may view use of this
technique as inconsistent with the requirements of Geneva III, Article 13
which provides that POWs must be protected against acts of
intimidation; Article 14 which provides that POWs are entitled to respect
for their person; Article 34 which prohibits coercion and article 126
which ensures access to basic standards of treatment. Although the
provisions of Geneva are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful
combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to
application of this technique.]
The Rumsfeld Memorandum also included a section entitled "General
Safeguards." It provided that:
Application of these interrogation techniques is subject to the following
general safeguards: (i) limited to use only at strategic interrogation
facilities; (ii) there is a good basis to believe that the detainee possesses
critical intelligence; (iii) the detainee is medically and operationally
.evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques to be used in
combination); (iv) interrogators are specifically trained for the techniques;
(v) a specific interrogation plan (including reasonable safeguards, limits
on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the
presence or availability of qualified medical personnel) has been
developed; (vi) there is appropriate supervision; and (vii) there is
appropriate specified senior approval for use with any specific detainee
(after conducting the foregoing and receiving legal advice).
The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most
information from a detainee with the least intrusive method, always applied
in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained
investigators or interrogators. Operating instructions must be developed
based on command policies to insure uniform, careful and safe application
of any interrogations of detainees.
Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into
account numerous, often interlocking factors such as a detainee's current
and past performance in both detention and interrogation, a detainee's
emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses, an assessment of possible
approaches that may work on a certain detainee in an effort to gain the trust
of the detainee, strengths and weaknesses of interrogators, and
augmentation by other personnel for a certain detainee based on other
factors.
Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the detainee's
emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation
operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted in close
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cooperation with the units detaining the individuals. The policies
established by the detaining units that pertain to searching, silencing and
segregating also play a role in interrogation of a detainee. Detainee
interrogation involves developing a plan tailored to an individual and
approved by senior interrogators. Strict adherence to policies/standard
operating procedures governing the administration of interrogation
techniques and oversight is essential.
